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ANTITRUST IMMUNITY UNDER FLORIDA'S
CERTIFICATE OF NEED PROGRAM

SCOTT

D. MAKAR*

ANTITRUST
concerns may arise when health care companies that
compete for certificates of need' enter into agreements among
themselves that limit such competition. A critical issue is whether
Florida's certificate of need program immunizes such agreements
from the application of the federal and state antitrust laws under the
state action doctrine 2 or the first amendment Noerr-Penningtondoctrine.3 This Article concludes that Florida's certificate of need program satisfies the state action immunity test for only particular types
of state-authorized and state-controlled conduct, thereby subjecting
certain other unauthorized anticompetitive agreements to antitrust liability. First amendment petition clause immunity under the NoerrPennington doctrine, however, is much broader than state action immunity and may be available for legitimate "petitioning" activities in
the legislative, administrative, and judicial forums.
I.

CERTIFICATE OF NEED REGULATION: BACKGROUND

The question of antitrust immunity under Florida's certificate of
need program requires a detailed review of Florida's certificate of
need regulatory structure. This review is followed by a brief discussion
of the purpose and efficacy of certificate of need regulations. As the
next section explains, the regulatory structure of Florida's certificate
of need program has evolved over time but has specifically retained
economic competition as one of its main objectives.

* Associate, Holland & Knight, Tallahassee, Florida; B.S., 1980, Mercer University;
M.B.A., 1982; M.A., 1982; J.D. 1987; Ph.D. Candidate, University of Florida. The author expresses his appreciation to Steve Brannock, Christine Whitney, and Eleanor Joseph for their
helpful suggestions. The views expressed in this Article, however, are solely those of the author.
I. A certificate of need is a "written statement issued by the department (Department of
Health and Rehabilitative Services) evidencing community need for a new, converted, expanded,
or otherwise significantly modified health care facility, health service, or hospice." FLA. STAT. §
381.702(2) (1989).
2. See infra text accompanying notes 71-136.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 137-203.

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LA WREVIEW

150
A.

[Vol. 19:149

The Regulatory Structure of Florida'sCertificateof Need
Program

Certificate of need programs impose extensive regulatory controls
on entry into health care service markets and on investments in health
care facilities. 4 Until recently, almost all states operated certificate of
need programs, primarily because the National Health Planning and
Resources Development Act of 19741 (NHPRDA) provided substantial
federal funding for state and local health planning activities. 6 The
NHPRDA required state certificate of need programs to conform to
federal standards, which subjected a broad range of proposed health
care facilities and projects to regulatory review and approval. 7 The
shift towards deregulation and increased reliance on free market incentives during the 1980s, however, led to the elimination of
NHPRDA's mandated certificate of need provisions in 1986.8 As a
consequence, many states have modified or eliminated their certificate
of need programs.
Florida, however, still retains a certificate of need program. Florida's first certificate of need program, enacted in 1972, regulated hospitals and nursing homes by requiring approval for addition of new
bed capacity, construction of additional health facilities, and major
alterations of facilities in excess of set financial limits. 9 The Legislature revised the certificate of need program numerous times between
1972 and 1986, consistently expanding the range of health services and
facilities subject to regulation as well as revising the program's administrative procedures. 0 Despite the broadened range of services and fa-

4. Havighurst, Regulation of Health Facilities and Services by "Certificate of Need," 59
VA. L. Rav. 1143, 1143 (1973). See also Simpson, Full Circle: The Return of Certificateof Need
Regulation of Health Facilitiesto State Control, 19 IND. L. REv. 1025, 1025 (1986). For a history of the origins of certificate of need legislation, see Payton & Powsner, Regulation Through
the Looking Glass: Hospitals, Blue Cross, and Certificate-of-Need, 79 MICH. L. Rv. 203

(1980).
5. Pub. L. No. 93-641, 88 Stat. 2225 (1975) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300k to 300n-6
(1982)), repealed by Pub. L. No. 99-660, § 701, 100 Stat. 3743, 3799 (1986).
6. In early 1986, forty-two states and the District of Columbia had statutes permitting
certificate of need programs. Simpson, supra note 4, at 1025.
7. See generally Simpson, supra note 4, at 1041-1061 (detailing the certificate of need requirements under NHPRDA).
8. The certificate of need portion of the NHPRDA was repealed by Pub. L. No. 99-660, §
701, 100 Stat. 3743, 3799 (1986).
9. Health Facilities Planning Act, Ch. 72-391, 1972 Fla. Laws 1364 (codified at FLA. STAT.
§§ 381.493-.497 (Supp. 1972)). See generally Gross, Certificate of Need: Background and Review
of Recent Changes in Florida'sLaw, 2 U. FLA. J.L. & Pua. POL'Y 183 (1988-1989) (discussing
the history of Florida's certificate of need program).
10. See, e.g., Ch. 82-182, 1982 Fla. Laws 628 (creates local health councils and raises dollar
amounts for capital expenditure and major medical equipment exemptions); Ch. 80-187, 1980
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cilities subject to regulation, the Legislature intended the program to
encourage the "strengthening of competitive forces in the health services industry."" In 1987, after the elimination of the certificate of
need program from federal law, Florida repealed its prior program
and enacted an extensively modified certificate of need program pursuant to the Health Facility and Services Development Act.' 2 The Act
provides that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services
(HRS) shall review applications and issue certificates of need for
13
health care facilities and services according to certain set criteria.
The Legislature has amended the program since 1987 and is consider4
ing additional revisions in the 1991 legislative session.
Florida's revised certificate of need program prohibits free and
unobstructed entry into health care markets by requiring that only licensed certificate holders may operate or provide approved health
care facilities" or services.' 6 Section 381.706, Florida Statutes, requires institutional health care providers,' 7 unless granted an exemption, 8 to obtain state approval before they incur certain capital
expenditures, change facilities' bed capacities, offer new or substantially different services, or acquire major medical equipment. 9 The

Fla. Laws 594 (expands Act to health care-related facilities and subjects more projects and facilities to program); Ch. 77-400, 1977 Fla. Laws 1684 (expands Act to include health services such
as home health agencies and health maintenance organizations); Ch. 77-147, 1977 Fla. Laws 492
(transfers authority to Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services).
11. FLA. STAT. § 381.493(2) (1985).
12. Ch. 87-92, 1987 Fla. Laws 355, 379-97 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 381.701-.715 (1989)).
The Act, however, retained many aspects of the prior certificate of need program and its administrative procedures.
13. Id. § 381.705.
14. See, e.g., Ch. 90-268, 1990 Fla. Laws 1940; Ch. 89-308, 1989 Fla. Laws 1998; Ch. 88380, 1988 Fla. Laws 1996; Ch. 88-394, 1988 Fla. Laws 2251. Five bills related to the certificate of
need program were enacted in 1991. One major substantive bill related to increases in fees for
licensed health care facilities. Fla. CS for CS for SB 1000 (1991). The other related to a modification of the methodology for nursing home bed cases. Fla. HB 1983 (1991).
15. A "health care facility" is a "hospital, skilled nursing facility, or intermediate care
facility. A facility relying solely on spiritual means through prayer for healing is not included as
a health care facility." FLA. STAT. § 381.702(7) (1989).
16. "Health services" are "diagnostic, curative, or rehabilitative services and include[] alcohol treatment, drug abuse treatment, and mental health services." Id. § 381.702(9).
17. Hospitals, skilled and intermediate care nursing homes, home health agencies, hospices,
and health maintenance organizations are all subject to certificate of need regulation for certain
projects subject to review. Id. § 381.706.
18. Certain facilities and services are exempt from certificate of need regulation. Id. §
381.706(3). Examples include facilities not directly used for the provision of health services such
as parking lots, meeting rooms, research buildings, and cafeterias. Id. Expenditures to replace
major medical equipment or to replace or renovate part of a licensed nursing facility are exempt.
Id. A number of other exemptions are also available.
19. Id.
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types of facilities, services, or transactions requiring a certificate of
need are numerous and include:
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)
g)
h)
i)

j)
k)
1)
m)
n)

20
additions of beds by new construction or alteration;
new construction or establishment of health care facilities;2
22
capital expenditures of $1 million or more;
conversion from one type of health care facility to another; 23
24
changes in licensed bed capacity;
establishment of a home health agency or hospice, or the provi25
sion of such services;
oracquisitions by health care facilities or health maintenance
26
ganizations that would require review if made by purchase;
establishment of or substantial changes in inpatient institutional
2
health services by a health care facility;
2
acquisition of an existing health care facility by any person;
acquisition of major medical equipment by a health care facility
29
or health maintenance organization;
project cost increases (i.e., cost-overruns);30
changes in the number of psychiatric or rehabilitation beds; 3'
establishment of tertiary health services;3 2 and
transfer of certificates of need."

Under the current certificate of need program, HRS is responsible

20. Id. § 381.706(i)(a).
21. FLA. STAT. § 381.706(1)(b) (1989).
22. Id. § 381.706(l)(c). The expenditure must be "on behalf of a health care facility or
hospice for a purpose directly related to the furnishing of health services at such facility." Id. A
certificate is not necessary for expenditures for outpatient health services or for some equipment.
HRS must adjust this capital expenditure threshold annually according to an appropriate inflation index. Id.
23. Id. § 381.706(l)(d). Conversions from one level of facility to another are also included.
Id.
24. Id. § 381.706(l)(e).
25. Id. § 381.706(l)(f). The establishment or provision must be "by a health care facility or
health maintenance organization for those other than the subscribers of the health maintenance
organization." Id.
26. Id. § 381.706(l)(g). Acquisitions at less than fair market value, if fair market value is
greater than the capital expenditure threshold, are also included. Id.
27. FLA. STAT. § 381.706(1)(h) (1989).
28. Id. § 381.706(l)(i). Review is not required if a person provides HRS with at least 30
days' written notice of the proposed acquisition and HRS does not determine that the services to
be provided and the bed capacity will be changed. Id.
29. Id. § 381.706(l)(j).
30. Id. § 381.706(1)(k). The cost increase must exceed statutory limits or 10% of the originally approved cost of the project, whichever is less. A cost overrun less than $10,000 is not
subject to review. Id.
31. Id. § 381.706(l)(1).
32. Id. § 381.706(1)(m).
33. FLA. STAT. § 381.706(l)(n) (1989). Expedited review is required.
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for planning all health care services in the state and preparing the state
health plan.3 4 In order to fulfill these responsibilities, HRS maintains
a health care data base that is used for certificate of need determinations."3 HRS acquires much of the information contained in this data
base from health facilities and health service providers as HRS deems
necessary. 6 HRS must establish methodologies for determining the
need for health services and facilities by considering population demographics, the population's health status, service use, 7 patterns and
trends, geographic accessibility, and market economics.
HRS is the sole agency that issues, revokes, or denies certificates of
need or exemptions from certificate of need review.38 In accordance
with the plans of the local and statewide health councils,3 9 HRS issues,
revokes, or denies a certificate of need application for facilities or
services based on fourteen statutorily defined criteria 0 Notably, one
criterion is the probable impact of the proposed facility or service on
competition in the supply and delivery of health services. 4 1 In fact, the
34. Id. § 381.703(4)(a).
35. Id. § 381.703(4)(b).
36. Id.
37. Id. § 381.704(3).
38. Id.381.704(1).
39. Local health councils are public or private nonprofit agencies that serve counties with
the 11 health care districts. FLA. STAT. § 381.703(l)(a) (1989). Each council is composed of members equaling one and one-half times the number of counties within the district or 12 members,
whichever is larger. Id. Members are appointed by the county commission within the district for
two-year terms. Id. These local health councils develop district health care plans according to
uniform methodologies and elements HRS establishes. Id.§ 381.703(l)(b). The Statewide Health
Council acts as an advisory council to HRS on state health policy issues, state and local health
planning activities, and state health regulation programs. Id. § 381.703(2)(a). Its membership
includes the 11 chairpersons of the local health councils and six political appointees (two appointed by the Governor, two by the President of the Senate, and two by the Speaker of the
House of Representatives). Id. § 381.703(2).
40. Id. § 381.705(1). In general, these criteria include (1) the need for the proposed facility
or services in relation to the district and state health plans; (2) the availability, quality of care,
efficiency, appropriateness, accessibility, extent of utilization and adequacy of like and existing
facilities or services in the district; (3) the applicant's ability to provide and record of providing
quality of care; (4) the availability and adequacy of other health care facilities and services in the
district; (5) the probable economies and improvements in service from the operation of joint,
cooperative or shared resources; (6) the district's needs for special equipment and services not
reasonably and economically accessible in adjoining areas; (7) the need for research and educational facilities; (8) availability, accessibility, and adaptability of resources and services for certain uses; (9) the immediate and long-term financial feasibility of the proposal; (10) the special
needs and circumstances of Health Maintenance Organizations; (11) the needs and circumstances
of entities providing a substantial portion of their services or resources to individuals not residing in the entities' district or adjacent districts; (12) the probable impact on competition in the
supply and delivery of health services that foster competition and promote quality assurance and
cost-effectiveness; (13) the costs and methods of the proposed construction; and (14) the applicant's past and proposed provision of health care services to Medicaid patients and the medically
indigent. Additional criteria for proposed capital expenditures for new inpatient health services
must also be considered. Id.§ 381.705(2).
41. Id.§ 381.705(1)(1).
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certificate of need regulatory framework explicitly retains the goals of
fostering competition, promoting quality assurance, and ensuring
cost-effectiveness. 42 Thus, not only must HRS rely, in part, upon market economics in establishing methodologies for determining needs, it
also must consider the competitive impact of proposed facilities and
services on health care markets.
Competition for certificates results from batches of applications
processed at least twice each year. 43 After applicants file their applications, staff recommendations are made and administrative hearings
are held." The end result is that HRS reviews applications45 and then
issues, denies, or revokes certificates for facilities throughout the
state's districts and subdistricts. After HRS issues a certificate of
need, it monitors the certificate holder's progress towards compliance
with the certificate conditions until the project is completed with the
assistance of local district health councils. 46
The types of conditions that HRS may impose are not statutorily set
or limited. Typical certificate conditions include maintaining a certain
number and type of beds and particular levels of Medicare patient
days. HRS may penalize certificate holders who do not meet certificate conditions or do not meet project timetables in good faith.47 Certificates terminate one year after issuance unless certain standards are
met (such as commencement of construction or the incursion of enforceable capital expenditures). 48 Extensions are permissible under certain circumstances . 9
B.

Certificate of Need Regulation: Consumer Boon or Boondoggle?

With the regulatory structure of Florida's certificate of need program in mind, the question of whether the program serves its lauda42. Id.
43. Id. § 381.709(1).
44. Id. § 381.709(3)-(5). Proceedings requiring formal administrative hearings are assigned
to the Department of Administrative Hearings. Following a formal hearing, the hearing officer
issues a recommended order which HRS may adopt or modify in making its final order 45 days
later. Id. § 381.709(5). Judicial review is available in the District Courts of Appeal. Id.
§ 381.709(6).
45. HRS reviews applications according to district health plans, fourteen statutory criteria,
and its own administrative rules. FA. STAT. § 381.705(2) (1989); FLA. ADhuN. CODE R. 10-5.011

(1990).
46. FLA. STAT. § 381.710 (1989); FLA. ADwN CODE R. 10-5.013 (1990). Additional reporting requirements subsequent to licensure or commencement of services also are mandated. FLA.
ADhnN CODE R. 10-5.013(4)(d) (1990).
47. FLA. STAT. §§ 381.710(1)(b), (2)(a) (1989). Administrative fines up to $1,000 per failure
per day and revocation of the certificate of need are potential penalties. Id.
48. Id. § 381.710(2).
49. Id.
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tory purpose naturally arises. Without a doubt, the efficacy of
certificate of need programs is a subject of considerable debate among
health care economists, legal scholars, and public policy makers. Certificate of need proponents claim that owners of health care facilities
have a tendency to engage in unnecessary expansion of facilities and
services that free market forces cannot sufficiently restrain. 0 Thus,
they urge that the primary purpose of a certificate of need program is
the avoidance of unnecessary duplication and expansion of health care
facilities and services and the resulting potential for reducing health
care costs. 5 Certificate of need proponents also assert that regulation
is necessary to prevent the construction of health care facilities that
attract only paying clients, thereby disadvantaging facilities that treat
financially needy patients. Consequently, another purpose of certificate of need regulation is to reallocate health services by requiring cer52
tificate holders to provide medical services to indigent citizens.
Opponents of certificate of need programs contend that certificate
of need regulation is ineffective and possibly counterproductive in
promoting efficient health care markets. For instance, Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) studies have concluded that certificate of need regulation has resulted in higher hospital costs. 53 The FTC Bureau of
Competition and Consumer Protection and Bureau of Economics
have concluded that certificate of need regulation interferes with com-

50. See Simpson, supra note 4, at 1028-29 n. 16.
According to CON [certificate of need] proponents, overinvestment occurs in the
health care industry because the marketplace does not control the supply of services.
Several reasons have been cited for this market failure. First, consumers have no incentive to react to cost increases because they receive insurance reimbursement. Second, the cost-based method of reimbursement which private insurers and the federal
government use to pay providers does not give any incentive to deliver services efficiently. Third, the competition for physicians encourages institutional health care facilities to lure physicians to their facilities by purchasing high technology equipment
and offering sophisticated services without regard to projected utilization rates.
Fourth, insurance companies do not bargain with health care providers over prices.

Gross, supra note 9, at 189; see also ANDERSON & KASS, CERTIFICATE OF NEED REGULATION OF
ENTRY INTO HomE HEALTH CARE V, 92 (1986) (Bureau of Economics Staff Report to the Federal
Trade Commission).
51. See Ponsoldt, Immunity Doctrine, Efficiency Promotion, and the Applicability of Federal Antitrust Law to State-Approved HospitalAcquisitions, 12 J. CORP. L. 37, 40 (1986). An
assumption underlying certificate of need legislation is that health care markets do not provide
adequate incentives for cost containment primarily because consumers and health care providers
do not directly confront actual medical costs due to health insurance payments. Simpson, supra
note 4, at 1028-29, n. 16. In addition, health care providers have traditionally competed on the
basis of price rather than quality and have ethical proscriptions to expand the provision of services regardless of cost considerations.
52. See Ponsoldt, supra note 51, at 40.
53. M. NOETHER, ComPETIoN AMONG HosPrrTAs 3. 82 (1987) (Bureau of Economics Staff
Report to the Federal Trade Commission); ANDERSON & KASS, supra note 50, at 106.
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4
petition and inhibits the rate of innovation in health care markets.
Competition is lessened because the certificate of need process "imposes substantial costs on applicants, in terms of both the effort required to obtain regulatory approval and the delays occasioned by the
regulatory process." 5 The certificate of need regulatory process also
protects incumbent firms from competition and innovation because
new entrants have the burden of demonstrating that a current unfulfilled need exists in the marketplace. This burden "reduces the possibility of entry by more efficient firms which would provide higher
quality and/or lower cost services and, possibly, replace the less effi3 6
cient firms. "
Certificate of need legislation also creates opportunities for incumbent firms to engage in nonprice predation, strategic business behavior designed to raise the operating costs of rival incumbent firms and
potential entrants. 7 An example is:

when a hospital seeks a certificate of need to enter a market. The
existing hospitals might oppose this application in bad faith; they
might join in opposing all such applications, exhausting all
administrative and judicial appeals regardless of the merits; or they
might file false or misleading information before the agency charged
with evaluating the applications. In this way, they increase the costs
and difficulty of entering their market."'

54. See, e.g., FTC Letter from John M. Mendenhall to the Honorable John F. Pressman
and the Honorable Donald W. Snyder (Mar. 30, 1988) (WESTLAW, FABR-FTC database)
(John M. Mendenhall is the Acting Director of the Federal Trade Commission's Cleveland Regional Office) [hereinafter FTC Letter).
55. Id. at 9.
56. Id. at 10. See Blair & Fesmire, Antitrust Treatment of Hospital Mergers, 2 U. FIA. J.L.
& PUB. PoL'y 25, 54 (1988-1989) (noting that certificate of need requirements pose "very high
entry barriers" that lessen the ability of hospitals to compete).
57. Calvani & Averitt, The Federal Trade Commission and Competition inthe Delivery of
Health Care, 17 CuMB. L. REV. 293, 298 (1987) (authors were Commissioner and Acting Assistant Director for Planning, Bureau of Compliance, respectively, with the Federal Trade Commission); see Jacobs, Examining Collusive Conduct in Health Care Markets: A Law
Enforcement Perspective, 33 FED. B. NEws & J. 334 (1986) (author was Director of Cleveland
Regional Office of the Federal Trade Commission); see generally Krattenmaker & Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YaE L.J. 209
(1986) (presenting and discussing economic models depicting exclusionary conduct); Salop &
Scheffman, Raising Rivals' Costs, 73 AMER. ECON. R. 267 (1983) (seminal article discussing how
nonprice predatory strategies can raise competitors' costs). A contrasting business strategy,
termed predatory pricing, is generally defined as pricing below some measure of short-term marginal or average variable cost (and sacrificing short-term profits) in order to drive rivals out of
the market (and thereby reap long-term monopoly profits). See generally R. BLAIR & D. KASERmAN, ANTfrRusT EcoNoincs 121-28 (1985) (analyzing various legal and economic definitions of
predatory pricing).
58. Calvani & Averitt, supra note 57, at 298-99.
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Nonprice predation has significant advantages over direct price competition. Nonprice predation is safer because a price predation strategy requires that the predator engage in below-cost pricing, thereby
significantly sacrificing short-term profits. In addition, price predation is a risky undertaking because it assumes that rivals will be driven
out of the marketplace and that entry barriers prohibit their immediate reentry, such that the predator will accrue future monopoly profits. The "price predator must sacrifice present dollars to reap future
and uncertain monopoly rents."5 9 In contrast, nonprice predation is
less expensive because legal expenses incurred to exclude a rival from
the market through the administrative process are generally much
lower than the short term profits sacrificed by an across-the-board
price cut. 6° Nonprice predation may also be less risky because it is
more difficult to detect and, as discussed later, may be protected under the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine.6 '
Critics of certificate of need programs also point out that because
entry into health care markets is difficult, incumbent companies are
sheltered from competition. 62 As a consequence, certificate of need
"regulation can make it more likely that providers will exploit whatever market power they have, individually or collectively, to raise
prices above (or reduce quality below) the competitive level." ' 63 In addition, health care innovation becomes stifled because the certificate
of need regulatory process cannot adequately respond to or account
for changes in technology or market demand. Despite the efforts of
health-planning agencies to predict and to provide guidance on future
health care trends, reliance on market forces provides greater flexibil-

59. Id. at 299; see also E. SULLIVAN & J. HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST AND ITS
EcONOMIC IMPLICATIONS, 253-62 (1988) (noting that predatory pricing strategies are expensive
and risky endeavors).
60. Calvani & Averitt, supra note 57, at 299-300. The authors point out that such costs can
be particularly low when groups of competitors join together and agree to share attorneys' fees.
Id. at 300.
61. Id. at 300. See infra text accompanying notes 137-203.
62. Antitrust economists point out that certificate of need programs may insulate incumbent firms from the competitive realities of the free market.
Ordinarily, poor economic performance - excessive prices, low quality, poor service
- provides an incentive for outsiders to enter or current rivals to expand. In the hospital industry, however, the expansion of supply is controlled by CON determinations ....
Whenever a hospital requests de novo entry or expansion, hearings are held
and the existing hospitals can intervene to oppose the new entry. Generally, the new
entrant cannot use opportunity for greater profit as a basis for establishing the need
for additional capacity. As long as there is sufficient capacity to handle the case load,
the state will not permit new entry.
Blair & Fesmire, supra note 56, at 54.
63. FTC Letter, supra note 54, at 5.
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ity in adapting to fluctuating market conditions." Finally, certificate
of need regulation raises the price of health care services, thereby imposing a "hidden tax" on consumers of such services that is used to
fund indigent care. 65 Critics contend that this certificate of need "tax"
is costly because it distorts the competitive process and falls disproportionately on consumers who are in poor health. 6
With this doctrinal debate in mind, it is clear that Florida's certificate of need regulatory scheme restricts the ability of health care companies to freely enter and serve various health care markets. These
regulatory restrictions reduce many, but not all, forms of economic
competition. As a consequence, some health care companies may enter otherwise anticompetitive agreements with their rivals, either because they believe such agreements are immune from antitrust scrutiny
or because they feel pressure to limit competition for certificates of
need under the administrative process. 6 These agreements, which may
be express or implied, may include market allocation or protection
agreements such as agreements to oppose or not to oppose particular
certificate of need applications or to apply for certificates of need
only in particular districts. They may also include agreements to stag-

ger competition for certificate of need applications in particular
batches and agreements to share strategic information" among competitors for certificates of need. Each of these types of agreements
generally violates the antitrust laws.69 Whether health care companies
who enter such agreements have immunity from antitrust liability is

the focus of the remainder of this Article. 70

64. Id.
65. Jd. at 6.
66. Id.
67. Because of latent hostility towards competitive change, "it is not surprising that a great
many lawsuits brought under the antitrust laws involve the health care industry. This suggests
that private collusive actions to curb competition are unlikely to disappear quickly." Greaney,
Competitive Reform in Health Care: The Vulnerable Revolution, 5 YALE J. ON REO. 179, 189
(1988).
68. For purposes of this Article, strategic information refers to a company's confidential,
nonpublic, strategic information related to business marketing, expansion, and planning.
69. See, e.g., Palmer v. BRG of Ga., III S. Ct. 401, (1990) (horizontal market allocation
per se violation); FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 110 S. Ct. 768 (1990) (horizontal
boycott in support of price-fixing agreement per se illegal); National Soc'y of Professional
Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978) (agreement to refrain from competitive bidding). A
number of cases describe the types of permissible and impermissible exchanges of strategic information. United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969) (informal exchange
of pricing information among competitors); Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268
U.S. 563 (1925); Cement Mfrs. Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588 (1925); United
States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371 (1923); American Column & Lumber Co. v.
United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921) (trade association's daily reporting of industry's sales, production, inventory and price change data illegal).
70. This Article does not discuss the availability of implied antitrust immunity for anticom-
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II.

STATE ACTION IMMUNITY DOCTRINE

Federal and state antitrust laws, which protect free market competition, prohibit agreements between private parties that restrain trade.7 '
These antitrust laws, however, do not apply to the state-authorized
and state-supervised actions of private parties. Over fifty years the
United States Supreme Court has developed a test for determining
when private anticompetitive conduct is exempt from the federal antitrust laws. 72 Under this state action immunity doctrine, 7 private anticompetitive conduct is immune from antitrust liability provided (a)
the state has clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed a policy to

petitive conduct undertaken pursuant to the National Health Planning and Resources Development Act (NHPRDA) before its repeal of mandated certificate of need regulations in 1986. See
National Gerimedical Hosp. & Gerontology Center v. Blue Cross, 452 U.S. 378 (1981). In National Gerimedical, the United States Supreme Court rejected implied antitrust immunity for a
health care insurer's refusal to permit a hospital to become a member of its insurance plan even
though the insurer's intent was to assist in the implementation of the NHPRDA. Despite the
elaborate federal, state, and local regulatory planning structure, the Court concluded that the
challenged conduct "was neither compelled nor approved by any governmental regulatory
body." Id. at 389. In addition, the application of the antitrust laws to the challenged conduct
would not frustrate the federal regulatory scheme or create a conflict with the orders of regulatory bodies. Id. at 390. The Court therefore rejected implied antitrust immunity both for the
particular challenged conduct (i.e., refusal to deal) and for any private conduct undertaken in
response to the health planning process. The Court concluded its analysis by noting that Congress intended that .' competition and consumer choice' are to be favored wherever they 'can
constructively serve ... to advance the purposes of quality assurance, cost effectiveness, and
access."' Id. at 392-93 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 300k-2(a)(17)) (ellipsis in original); see also Huron
Valley Hosp., Inc. v. City of Pontiac, 666 F.2d 1029, 1033-34 (6th Cir. 1981) (NHPRDA does
not effect an implied repeal of the application of federal antitrust laws to hospital marketplace);
cf. Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 691 F.2d 678, 685 (4th Cir. 1982) (although
NHPRDA does not contain an express antitrust exemption, a narrow and special "rule of reason" is necessary to permit private parties' participation in certain planning activities that might
otherwise violate the antitrust laws), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 890, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 904
(1983).
71. Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988); Clayton and Robinson-Patman Price
Discrimination Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1988); Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§
41-45 (1989); FLA. STAT. §§ 542.15 -.32 (1989) (Florida Antitrust Act of 1980).
72. This judicially-created doctrine is an accommodation between conflicting interests: state
sovereignty and federal supremacy. Ordinarily, the supremacy clause requires that federal law
supersede state or local laws. However, the notion that the federal antitrust laws override and
nullify all state and local regulations that restrain competition is as untenable as the notion that
such state and local regulations can trump valid federal statutes. Thus, the doctrine emerged as
"an appropriate accommodation between the federal interest in fostering competition and the
conflicting state interests in restricting competition by immunizing some, but not all, stateauthorized or enforced restraints from antitrust scrutiny." Elhauge, The Scope of Antitrust
Process, 104 HARV. L. REV. 668, 669 (1991).
73. The doctrine is also termed the Parker doctrine based on the seminal case of Parker v.
Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), in which the Supreme Court upheld the actions of a state commission which set prices and restricted the output of raisin growers. The Court in Parker made clear
that a state could impose a restraint on competition based on principles of federalism and state
sovereignty arising from the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution. Id.
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displace competition with regulation, and (b) the state actively supervises and controls the private anticompetitive conduct. 74 This two-part
state action test is also termed the Midcal test. 75 Both parts of the test
must be met; a state cannot merely grant immunity to those persons
who violate the federal antitrust laws or simply declare their actions
lawful. 76 Instead, the test requires that a state intend to displace competition with regulation and actively supervise and control the private
parties' anticompetitive conduct.
A.

Part One: The "Clearly Articulated" Prong

The first part of the Midcal test ensures that the federal antitrust
interest in competition is not supplanted unless a state actually intends
to displace economic competition. For instance, the first part is undoubtedly satisfied if a state statute explicitly authorizes private parties to engage in the challenged conduct or restraint. 77 In contrast, a

74. Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 100-101 (1988); Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conf.,
Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 57 (1985). When a state or other political subdivision, such as
a municipality, engages in anticompetitive conduct, a court only considers the first part of the
state action test, i.e., whether a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy exists.
Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 39-40 (1985); Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S.
558 (1984) (committee established by state supreme court to grade bar exams is immune from
antitrust liability); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (state supreme court's restraint on attorney advertising is immune from federal antitrust attack).
75. See California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97
(1980). The state action doctrine is also applicable under the Florida Antitrust Act of 1980,
which provides that "[a]ny activity or conduct exempt under Florida statutory or common law
or exempt from the provisions of the antitrust laws of the United States is exempt from the
provisions of this chapter." FLA. STAT. § 542.20 (1989). Florida and federal cases discussing the
state action doctrine's application under the Florida Antitrust Act have consistently applied the
federal state action test. See, e.g., Sebring Util. Comm'n v. Home Say. Ass'n, 508 So. 2d 26
(Fla. 2d DCA) (application of test to municipality), rev. denied, 515 So. 2d 230 (Fla. 1987).
76. Parker, 317 U.S. at 351; Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384,
386 (1951).
77. See, e.g., Todorov v. DCH Healthcare Auth., 921 F.2d 1438 (1Ilth Cir. 1991). In Todoroy, a neurologist excluded from the medical staff of a hospital organized as a health care authority sued the hospital for federal antitrust violations. The hospital claimed state action
immunity based on an Alabama statute, the Alabama Health Care Authority Act, that authorized hospitals to establish themselves as health care authorities and empowered such authorities
to "select and appoint medical and dental staff members and others licensed to practice the
healing arts." Id. at 1460. Based upon its analysis of the Act, the Eleventh Circuit had little
difficulty in concluding that the hospital had immunity. First, the Act clearly authorized the
challenged conduct (i.e., regulation of staff privileges). Second, the Act made clear that the
state's policy was to displace competition in the health care field. Finally, the Act made explicit
that such conduct, even if deemed to be anticompetitive and violative of the state or federal
antitrust laws, is authorized pursuant to state authority. Based upon the state's clear delegation
of power to health care authorities and the state's clear statement of its public policy in displacing competition, "this case involves a statute that expressly authorizes anticompetitive conduct."
Id. at 1462. The court, therefore, held that antitrust immunity was mandatory.
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state policy that is either neutral or does not permit or contemplate
the specific anticompetitive conduct does not satisfy the test. 78 In between these two extremes is a wide range of state statutes that articulate and delegate regulatory authority with various degrees of clarity
and precision.
For instance, a difficult issue is whether the first part of the test is
satisfied in the absence of express statutory authority either compelling or permitting the challenged conduct. In Southern Motor Carriers
Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States,79 the Supreme Court held that
the absence of compelled conduct does not necessarily doom a claim
of antitrust immunity. The Mississippi statute at issue authorized the
state public service commission to establish "just and reasonable"
rates for the intrastate transportation of commodities. Because the
commission exercised its discretion to actively encourage collective
ratemaking among competing common carriers, the Court held such
private ratemaking activity was state-authorized and therefore immune. s° The Court stated:
A private party acting pursuant to an anticompetitive regulatory
program need not "point to a specific, detailed legislative
authorization" for its challenged conduct. As long as the State as
sovereign clearly intends to displace competition in a particular field
with a regulatory structure, the first prong of the Midcal test is
satisfied. 8
This deference to a state's regulatory intentions makes it much easier
to meet the "clearly articulated" prong and also eliminates any balancing of federal and state interests. Before Southern Motor Carriers,
the Supreme Court indicated that the state's interest in its regulation
could be balanced against the federal antitrust interest. The Court had
stated that it "has consistently refused to find that [state] regulation
gave rise to an implied exemption without first determining that ex-

78. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 55-56 (1982) (municipality exercising its home rule powers not immune because no clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy); Lancaster Community Hosp. v. Antelope Valley Hosp. Dist., Nos.
89-55167, 89-55347 (WESTLAW, ALLFEDS database) (9th Cir. July 15, 1991) (state authorization for local hospital districts to provide hospital services does not, by itself, provide immunity
to district; state's general policy is to promote competition unless displaced with regulation).
79. 471 U.S. 48 (1985). The United States contended that the collective ratemaking activities
of rate bureaus composed of motor common carriers violated federal antitrust laws.
80.

Id. at 64.

81.

Id. (citations omitted).
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Act work, 'and
emption was necessary in order to make the regulatory
82
necessary.'''
extent
minimum
even then only to the
The Court in Southern Motor Carriers,however, foreclosed the argument that a state regulation must be necessary to fulfill the state's
regulatory purpose in order to acquire immunity. Instead, the Court
created a "clear intent to displace competition" standard which
greatly defers to state regulatory interests by eliminating any consideration of the federal antitrust interest in competition. This standard
weakens the "clear articulation" prong but still leaves open the possibility that private anticompetitive conduct might fall outside of the
range of conduct a state foreseeably and logically intended to regulate. In Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire,3 the Supreme Court
rejected the argument that a state statute evidencing the state's policy
to displace competition must expressly mention the challenged anticompetitive conduct or that anticompetitive effects are intended.84 If
the statutes at issue "clearly contemplate" that the challenged anticompetitive conduct will occur, that such conduct is a "foreseeable"
result of the statutes, and that anticompetitive effects will "logically"
result from such conduct, the first prong of the Midcal test is met.85
Although the Court in Town of Hallie determined that the challenged
conduct at issue was foreseeable, lower courts have applied the "foreseeability" requirement and applied the antitrust laws to anticompetitive conduct that state statutes did not envision.8
The Supreme Court's recent decision in City of Columbia v. Omni
Outdoor Advertising, Inc. 7 further eases the requirements of the first
part of the Midcal test. In Omni Outdoor Advertising, a Columbia,

82. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 597 (1976) (quoting Silver v. New York
Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963) (public utility's program of distributing free light bulbs to
its customers not immune from antitrust laws because no state authorization for such program)).
83. 471 U.S. 34 (1985). At issue was whether a Wisconsin statute authorizing municipalities
to construct and maintain sewage systems immunized a city from monopolization charges
brought by neighboring unincorporated townships. The townships claimed that the city monopolized sewage services and would provide such services only if the townships were willing to be
annexed. Id.at 36-37.
84. "It is not necessary ... for the state Legislature to have stated explicitly that it expected the City to engage in conduct that would have anticompetitive effects." Id. at 42.
85. Id.
86. See, e.g., Bolt v. Halifax Hosp. Medical Center, 891 F.2d 810, 825 (11th Cir. 1990)
(hospital district did not have state action immunity because "nothing indicates that the Legislature should have foreseen the type of anticompetitive conduct alleged in this case"), on remand
from, 874 F.2d 755 (1lth Cir. 1989), reinstating opinion in part on reh'g from, 861 F.2d 1233
(1lth Cir.), granting reh'g and vacating opinion from, 851 F.2d 1273 (1988), cert. denied, 110 S.

Ct. 1960 (1990).
87. 111 S. Ct. 1344 (1991). Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion in which Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Blackmun, O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter concurred. Justice Stevens
wrote a dissenting opinion joined by Justices White and Marshall.
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South Carolina billboard advertising company with ninety-five percent of the local billboard market and very close relations with city
officials, successfully lobbied the city officials to enact zoning ordinances restricting further billboard construction. Because the city ordinances severely hindered a rival billboard company's ability to
compete, the rival sued the city and the dominant billboard company
claiming violations of federal and state antitrust laws. The plaintiff's
theory was that the city officials and the dominant billboard company
had engaged in an anticompetitive conspiracy that stripped them of
whatever state action or Noerr-Pennington immunity they may have
otherwise had. A jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, but the trial
court granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict to the defendants.
The appellate court, in a split decision, reversed and reinstated the
jury's verdict.18
The primary issue before the Supreme Court in Omni Outdoor Advertising was whether a "conspiracy" exception to the state action
and Noerr-Penningtonimmunity doctrines existed.8 9 An ancillary issue
was whether the first part of the Midcal test had been met. The majority opinion held that broad delegations of power to municipalities to
regulate for the general welfare bestow antitrust immunity even
though such powers do not specifically authorize economic regulation
of a specific industry.90 For instance, the statute at issue in Omni Outdoor Advertising granted municipalities the authority to regulate
buildings and other structures "[flor the purpose of promoting health,
safety, morals or the general welfare of the community." 9' The statute
did not specifically authorize the regulation of billboards. Nevertheless, the majority deemed the statute sufficiently broad to protect "existing billboards against some competition from newcomers." ' 92 The
Court stated that "[i]t is enough ... if suppression of competition is
the 'foreseeable result' of what the statute authorizes." 93 Because a
"municipality need not 'be able to point to a specific, detailed legisla-

88. Omni Outdoor Adv., Inc. v. Columbia Outdoor Adv., Inc., 891 F.2d 1127 (4th Cir.
1989), rev'd, I1I S. Ct. 1344(1991).
89. The Supreme Court squarely rejected the application of a "conspiracy" exception to
both the state action and Noerr-Pennington doctrines. See infra text accompanying notes 172178. However, the Court, in dicta, left open the possibility of a "market participant" exception
in situations where the government acts in a commercial, proprietary role. See also Municipal
Util. Bd. of Albertville v. Alabama Power Co., No. 90-7095 (1lth Cir. July 5, 1991) (WESTLAW ALLFEDS database) (to be reported at 934 F.2d 1493) (rejecting "public co-conspirator" and "ratification" exceptions to state action doctrine).
90. Omni Outdoor Advertising, 111 S. Ct. at 1349.
91. Id. at 1349 n.3.
92. Id. at 1350.
93. Id. (citing Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 42 (1985)).
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tive authorization' in order to assert a successful [state action] defense
to an antitrust suit," the lack of specific authority in the statute did
not lessen or eliminate the city's immunity.9
The holding in Omni OutdoorAdvertising involved the application
of the state action immunity test to municipalities, not to private parties. 95 The Court has not articulated different standards under the first
prong of the Midcal test for political subdivisions versus private actors. Thus, read in conjunction with Southern Motor Carriers, which
involved private party immunity, the inescapable conclusion of Omni
Outdoor Advertising is that the Supreme Court has expanded the
scope of the first part of the state action test to include most delegations of regulatory authority, whether exercised by municipalities or
private parties. In effect, the Court has diluted the "clearly articu9
lated" prong of the Midcal test to a "clearly delegated" standard. 6
Although Southern Motor Carriersand Omni Outdoor Advertising

have made the first part of the Midcal test easier to establish, courts
may still be hesitant to imply antitrust immunity unless the challenged
conduct is a foreseeable result of the state's regulatory scheme.9 7 For
instance, in an Eleventh Circuit case9 " decided before Omni Outdoor
Advertising-Bolt v. Halifax Hospital Medical Center99-the Eleventh
Circuit analyzed whether Florida's medical peer review statute satisfied the first part of the state action test. A physician alleged that a
hospital district and a hospital and its staff had conspired to boycott
his services and to deny him staff privileges. The hospital district as-

94.

Id. at 1350 n.4 (quoting Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. at 34, 39 (1985),

and City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 415 (1978)).

95. As mentioned previously, only the first part of the Midcal test applies in analyzing
whether political subdivisions of the state have antitrust immunity. Town of Hallie v. City of
Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34 (1985).
96.

See Garland, Antitrust and State Action: Economic Efficiency and the Political Proc-

ess, 96 YA a L.J. 486, 501 (1987) (state action test is "an effort to control delegation" and seeks
to "bar delegation to private parties of the power to restrain competition").
97. Town of Hallie, 471 U.S. at 42 (applying foreseeability criterion).
98. The extent of state action immunity under Florida's certificate of need program depends upon both federal court and state court decisions applying the United States Supreme
Court's precedents. Few Florida cases discuss the state action immunity doctrine at length, primarily because Florida's antitrust laws rely explicitly on federal judicial interpretations of federal
antitrust provisions. FLA. STAT. § 542.32 (1989) (in construing Florida's antitrust act, the Legislature stated its intention that "due consideration and great weight be given to the interpretations of the federal courts relating to comparable federal antitrust statutes"). Because federal
antitrust actions filed in Florida are bound by the decisions of the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals (and former Fifth Circuit cases), cases from the Eleventh Circuit are helpful in discussing the application of the state action doctrine to Florida's certificate of need program.
99. 891 F.2d 810 (1 1th Cir. 1990), on remandfrom, 874 F.2d 755 (11th Cir. 1989), reinstating opinion in part on reh'gfrom, 861 F.2d 1233 (11 th Cir.), granting reh 'g and vacating opinion from, 851 F.2d 1273 (1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1960 (1990).
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serted that Florida's peer review statute satisfied the first part of the
state action immunity test.10
The court initially determined that, in authorizing medical peer review, the Florida Legislature clearly articulated a policy to displace
competition and that the Legislature could foresee that hospital districts would rely upon recommendations made by a physician's peers
in exercising their "virtually unreviewable power to hire (or not hire)"
physicians. 0°' Nonetheless, the court stated:
While the Florida Legislature must have foreseen that [the medical
district] would engage in anticompetitive conduct based on
recommendations of the physician's peers, nothing indicates that the
Legislature should have foreseen the type of anticompetitive conduct
alleged in this case [i.e. a conspiracy to boycott].10 2
The court therefore held that the hospital district did not have state
action immunity for the challenged conduct. Thus, the hospital district was without immunity because "its conduct constitutes anticompetitive conduct that is not a foreseeable result of [the hospital
district's] enabling legislation" and was inconsistent with the district's
requirement to act in the "public good."'0 3 The excluded physician
therefore properly alleged an unauthorized and unforeseeable conspiracy in which the hospital district participated.°4
As the foregoing discussion illustrates, the Supreme Court has increasingly construed the first part of the Midal test as requiring only
a clear delegation of authority from a state such that the challenged
anticompetitive conduct is a foreseeable result of the delegation. This
relaxation of the requirements of the first prong is an indication of the
Court's greater deference to the states and their regulatory regimes.
This deference, however, is not limitless. Unless the challenged anticompetitive conduct is a foreseeable result of the state's regulatory
program, the first part of the test is not met. As the next section discusses, the Court has simultaneously tightened the second prong of
the Midcal test so that private anticompetitive conduct, even if state-

100. The court only analyzed the "clearly expressed state policy" part because it found the
hospital district sufficiently similar to a municipality, thus requiring only the single prong test of
Town of Halie. Id. at 825. See also Todorov v. DCH Healthcare Auth., 921 F.2d 1438, 1460-62
(1 th Cir. 1991) (hospital organized as a health care planning authority pursuant to state statute
is a "political subdivision" of the state).
101. Bolt, 891 F.2d at 825.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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authorized and subject to state monitoring and scrutiny, is not entitled
to immunity.
B.

Part Two: The "Active State Supervision" Prong

Over the past decade, the United States Supreme Court has consistently refused to extend immunity to private actors under a number of
different state regulatory structures due to the lack of active state supervision of the anticompetitive acts. 05 Thus, although the first part
of the Midcal test has become easier to meet, the second part of the
test, active state supervision, has become increasingly more difficult to
satisfy. In essence, the first prong of the state action test has evolved
to protect the state interest in restraining competition, while the second prong has evolved to protect the countervailing federal interest in
promoting competition. The first prong defers to the anticompetitive
actions of public actors while the second prong closely scrutinizes the
anticompetitive actions of private actors.
In Patrick v. Burget,' 6 the Court drastically reformulated the active
supervision prong by requiring active state control of the challenged
conduct. In holding that an Oregon medical peer review statute did
not satisfy this requirement, the Court stated that "[tihe active supervision requirement stems from the recognition that '[w]here a private
party is engaging in the anticompetitive activity, there is a real danger
that he is acting to further his own interests, rather than the governmental interests of the State." ' 0 7
The requirement is designed to ensure that the state action doctrine
will shelter only the particular anticompetitive acts of private parties
that, in the judgment of the State, actually further state regulatory
policies. To accomplish this purpose, the active supervision
requirement mandates that the State exercise ultimate control over
the challenged anticompetitive conduct. The mere presence of some
state involvement or monitoring does not suffice. The active
supervision prong ... requires that state officials have and exercise

105. See, e.g., Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94 (1988) (insufficient state supervision of hospital peer review process); 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335 (1987) (no active state supervision of resale price maintenance system); FTC v. Indiana Fed'n. of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986)
(anticompetitive collusion among dentists regarding provision of x-rays to insurers not immune
because no active state supervision); California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980) (insufficient state involvement in price-setting system).
106. 486 U.S. 94 (1988). For an overview of medical peer review immunity in light of Patrick, see generally Langley, Does Medical Peer Review Immunity Exist After Patrick v. Burget?
A Review of the Legal Fundamentals, 2 U. FLA. J.L. & Pun. POL'Y 137 (1988-1989).
107. Patrick, 486 U.S. at 100 (quoting Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 47
(1985)).
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power to review particular anticompetitive acts of private parties and
disapprove those that fail to accord with state policy. Absent such a
program of supervision, there is no realistic assurance that a private
party's anticompetitive conduct promotes state policy, rather than
merely the party's individual interests.'10
The Court's concern is that the "national policy in favor of competition [not] be thwarted by casting such a gauzy cloak of state involvement over what is essentially a private [antitrust violation]."0 9 As a
result, the Court held that mere state oversight of or involvement in
private parties' anticompetitive conduct is insufficient to protect the
federal interest in competition. Instead, active and ultimate control of
the challenged anticompetitive activity by the state is necessary.
Two recent opinions from the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
illustrate the difficulty in satisfying the active state supervision prong.
In Shahawy v. Harrison,"° the district court ruled that Florida's peer
review system immunized a hospital board from federal antitrust liability. The Eleventh Circuit reversed because it held Florida's peer review system "fails to actively supervise the hospital board's
decisions.""' Although Florida enacted a "comprehensive scheme
regulating health care" and delineated the scope of state involvement,
the critical element of state supervision was lacking. "[No state official reviews specific peer review board decisions regarding clinical
privileges to determine whether such decisions comport with state policy."" 2 The hospital board, therefore, had no antitrust immunity.
In a highly unusual case, Consolidated Gas Co. of Floridav. City
Gas Co., "3 the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a district court's finding that

108.
109.

Id. at 101 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. at 97, 106

(1980).
110. 875 F.2d 1529 (11th Cir. 1989).
Ill. Id. at 1535. The court stated that because the active state supervision prong was not
met, it did not need to address the clear articulation prong of the test. It appears, however, that

the court's analysis was flawed because the defendant in Shahawy, the Sarasota County Public
Hospital Board, was a public rather than private entity. The court therefore should have only
determined whether the first prong of the Midcal test was met. Active state supervision of a
public entity is not necessary. The court may therefore have reached an incorrect result because
Florida's medical peer review statute, chapter 395, Florida Statutes, and the county hospital
statute, chapter 155, Florida Statutes, appear to delegate to county hospitals significant regulatory powers related to hospital privileges. The court's proper focus should have been whether the
conduct at issue in Shahawy was a foreseeable result of such delegated regulatory authority.
Nevertheless, the court's analysis of the active state supervision prong, although unnecessary,
appears correct.
Id.
880 F.2d 297 (11 th Cir. 1989), reh'g granted and opinion vacated, 889 F.2d 264 (1989),
on reh'g, 912 F.2d 297 (1 lth Cir. 1990) (en banc) (per curiam opinion reinstating panel opinion),
112.
113.
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territorial agreements entered into by natural gas utility companies
and approved by the Florida Public Service Commission (PSC) were
not immune from antitrust liability. The appellate court held that
Florida's statutes did not provide a clearly articulated state policy of
permitting such agreements nor was there active state supervision of
14
such agreements.'
At the outset, the panel opinion recites that a "statute need not explicitly state what conduct is and is not permissible in order for that
conduct to be undertaken pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy.""' Nonetheless, the panel rejected the argument that the first part
of the Midcal test was satisfied simply because the Florida Supreme
Court had previously concluded the PSC had authority to approve
these agreements." 6 Instead, the court stated that the determination of
whether the first part is satisfied is "ultimately a question of federal
antitrust law." '" 7 The court undertook its own inquiry and was persuaded by the fact that other utilities (such as electric utilities) had the
express authority to enter territorial agreements while natural gas utilities did not."' It therefore concluded that "no clearly articulated state
policy authorized this agreement.""19
The court also held that active state supervision did not exist for
two reasons. First, the PSC had no express authority to develop standards for creating or reviewing such agreements on a regular basis.' 20
Second, judicial supervision over the territorial agreements was insuf-

cert. granted and judgment vacated as moot, I l I S. Ct. 1300 (1991). Ten judges, including two
judges who were on the panel, participated in the en bane proceedings. A majority of seven
judges agreed to affirm the judgment of the district court. Two of these judges, however, were
unwilling to affirm the holding of the district court and panel opinion finding no antitrust immunity. Thus, five of the ten en banc judges dissented on the ground that the state action immunity doctrine should apply to the facts at issue. Because the en bane court was equally divided on
the state action immunity issue, the panel opinion's holding prevails.
114. Consolidated Gas, 880 F.2d at 301-04.
115. Id. at 302 (citing Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conf., Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S.
48, 63-64 (1988).
116. See City Gas Co. v. Peoples Gas System, 182 So. 2d 429 (Fla. 1965).
117. Consolidated Gas, 880 F.2d at 303.
118. Chapter 366, Florida Statutes, expressly grants electric utilities such authority but is
silent as to natural gas utilities. The court found this "compelling evidence that the Legislature
in fact did not intend for natural gas utilities to also enjoy exclusive territorial agreements."
Consolidated Gas, 880 F.2d at 302. In addition, the PSC had itself expressed doubt regarding its
authority in a 1985 tariff filing. In this action, however, the PSC urged the court to find that
antitrust immunity existed. Id. at 301-02.
119. Consolidated Gas Co. of Fla. v. City Gas Co., 880 F.2d 297, 303 (11 th Cir. 1989), reh'g
granted and opinion vacated, 889 F.2d 264 (1989), on reh'g, 912 F.2d 297 (11th Cir. 1990) (en
banc) (per curiam opinion reinstating panel opinion), cert. granted and judgment vacated as
moot, I IIS. Ct. 1300 (1991).
120. Id. The court also noted that this agreement was the only one of its kind in Florida.

1991]

CER TIFICA TE OFNEED

ficient to meet the second part of the test. 21' The court stated: "[T]he
Supreme Court has consistently contemplated a more vigorous, probing supervision than mere acquiescence. This is at bottom an agreement entered into by private parties, in pursuit of their own economic
interests, that is neither authorized by the State, nor closely monitored
by it."12 Needless to say, ConsolidatedGas has had a profound effect
on the natural gas industry in Florida, and its state action immunity
analysis has spawned considerable disagreement.' 2 3
The Bolt, Shahawy, and Consolidated Gas opinions indicate judicial reluctance to find antitrust immunity in the absence of explicit
legislative authority for-and active state supervision of-the challenged conduct. In each case, the court refused to find antitrust immunity despite the existence of either a complex regulatory regime or
a judicial opinion affirming the Legislature's intent to displace competition with regulation. In particular, the Eleventh Circuit requires a
substantial degree of active and continuous state supervision in order
to meet the second prong.124 The court's analysis supports the impor-

121. Id. See also Bolt v. Halifax Hosp. Medical Center, 874 F.2d 755, 756 (11th Cir. 1989)
(at oral argument before en banc court the appellee hospitals and their medical staffs abandoned
their argument that judicial supervision can satisfy active state supervision).
122. Consolidated Gas, 880 F.2d at 303.
123. See Consolidated Gas, 912 F.2d 1262, 1338 (11th Cir. 1990) (Johnson, J. and Tjoflat,
C.J., dissenting).
124. This point is evident in another recent Eleventh Circuit electric utility case, Municipal
Util. Bd. of Albertville v. Alabama Power Co., No. 90-7095 (11th Cir. July 5, 1991) (WESTLAW, ALLFEDS database) (to be reported at 934 F.2d 1493). Thirty municipal and public
corporations that own and operate electric distribution facilities sued 22 rural electric cooperatives, a rural electric association, and a private electric power company alleging that these defendants illegally agreed to horizontally divide electric service territories. The plaintiffs also
contended that the defendants conspired with the Alabama Legislature and government to ratify
and thereby immunize existing illegal territorial agreements through legislative action. The general provisions of the Alabama acts in question assigned service territories to private and municipal electric suppliers for the stated purpose of limiting wasteful duplication of transmission
facilities. In addition, "special rules" in the acts incorporated private territorial agreements previously reached by electric suppliers. The trial court dismissed the antitrust claims based on the
state action and Noerr-Penningtondoctrines. Id. at 2.
Among other issues, the Eleventh Circuit addressed whether the legislatively-assigned and the
privately-assigned service territories were shielded from antitrust scrutiny under the state action
immunity doctrine. The court concluded that the legislatively-assigned territories met the twopart Midcal test because the Alabama legislature had clearly articulated a policy to displace competition in the retail electric service market and that active state supervision was provided
through strict state control over the assignment of such territories. The court determined that the
legislature controlled all of the decisions regarding the division of service territories and that
private parties exercised no regulatory authority over the challenged restraints. The court could
not determine, however, whether there was active state supervision of the private agreements.
Consequently, the court remanded the case for consideration of whether the private agreements
qualified for state action immunity under the active supervision prong. Id. at 9. The court's
decision, therefore, further demonstrated the stringent requirement of active state control of a
challenged restraint under the second part of the Midcal test.
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tant values underlying the antitrust laws (i.e., promoting competition
and consumer welfare) and places a heavy burden on the Florida Legislature to provide sufficiently clear legislation and active supervision
to warrant antitrust immunity.
C.

Antitrust State Action Cases Analyzing Other States' Certificate
of Need Programs
In the certificate of need context, courts that have considered the
extent of supervision necessary to meet the second part of the Midcal
test have reached somewhat dissimilar conclusions. For instance, in
North Carolinaex rel. Edmisten v. P.LA. Asheville, 2 the state attorney general challenged the acquisition of fifty percent of the stock in a
psychiatric facility by the largest national private operator of acute
psychiatric hospitals. 2 6 The court concluded that once a hospital acquisition passes certificate of need review, however, the "state makes
no attempt to monitor the use of the acquisition."'' 27 The certificate of
need statute "in no way attempts to monitor the conduct of health
care providers to be sure it is in harmony with the expressed goals" of
federal and state legislation.1'2 The appellate court therefore found no
state action immunity because active state supervision of the acquisition was lacking. The court's rationale was simply that if a state fails
to provide continuous, ongoing scrutiny of hospital acquisitions, state
29
action immunity is unavailable.
In General Hospitals of Humana, Inc. v. Baptist Medical System,
Inc.,' 30 however, the court disagreed with the analysis in P.I.A. Asheville. The challenged conduct in Baptist Medical was the defendant's
past expansions and overbedding designed to eliminate competition.
The court determined that both parts of the Midcal test are met for
this type of conduct. 3 ' Regarding the active state supervision prong,
the court reviewed the certificate of need statute and determined that:
there is some continuing supervision by the state in that any cost
overruns must be approved by the regulatory process, and any

125. 740 F.2d 274 (4th Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1003 (1985).
126. Id. at 276.
127. Id. at 278.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. 1986-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,996 (E.D. Ark. 1986).
131. Under the first part of the test, the court found that "the state subjected defendant's
proposals to exacting scrutiny to determine whether, in the state's view, the expansions were
necessary and appropriate." Id. at 62,116. Although the certificate of need act "was not intended to supplant competition in every area of health care, . . . [it was) intended to supplant
competition with respect to expansion of bed capacity." Id. Thus, a clearly articulated state
policy existed. Id.
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significant future expansions require an additional CON. Even more
importantly, continuing supervision exists in the sense that the state
always considers the present situation of an entire area in
determining whether to grant a CON. Thus, because it has absolute
control over whether new entry is permitted, and because the
decision concerning new entry is based on an evaluation of the
existing conditions, the state has a powerful lever, albeit an indirect
one, with which to control the entire system.'
The court held that total regulatory control of the challenged conduct
was unnecessary and that the challenged conduct need not be compelled by the state in order to establish active state supervision.' 33 The
court also recognized that the state's control would be more active
and effective if it had the authority to require a hospital to reduce
beds.3 4 Nonetheless, the court found sufficient state oversight to meet
the active supervision test.'
The different results in the P.LA. Asheville and Baptist Medical
cases are attributable to a number of factors. First, the challenged
conduct in each action was different (acquisition of hospital versus
acquisition of bedding capacity). Many state certificate of need programs do not monitor or control the former, while most monitor and
control the latter. Also, the courts' interpretations of the extent of
state supervision differed. Both decisions predated the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Patrick v. Burgett3 6 and, therefore, both
may have been willing to give too much deference to the extent of
state monitoring and oversight. This is true particularly in the Baptist
Medical case.

III.

THE NOERR-PENNNGTON

DOCTRINE

In a line of cases beginning in 1961, the United States Supreme
Court established that the first amendment petition clause protects
businesses and business associations from antitrust liability for the legitimate exercise of their rights to petition the government, whether it
be the legislative branch, the executive branch, an administrative
agency, or the courts. This doctrine, termed the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine, shields such "petitioning" activities from the antitrust laws

132.
133.
U.S. 48
134.
135.
136.

Id.

Id. at 62,116-17 (citing Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conf., Inc. v. United States, 471
(1988).
Id. at 62,116.
Id.
486 U.S. 94 (1988).
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13 7
even if the activities are undertaken for anticompetitive purposes.
The doctrine is based on the principle that the right to petition the
government under the first amendment supersedes the federal antitrust interest in competition. The doctrine, however, does not shield
abusive "sham" activities designed to directly interfere with a competitor's business relations.
The doctrine is anomalous because while courts have recently
strengthened the state action doctrine and made antitrust immunity
for private parties difficult to establish, courts have simultaneously
and uniformly extended antitrust immunity to almost any type of anticompetitive petitioning activity by private parties under the guise of
Noerr-Penningtonimmunity. The doctrine has evolved such that "all
activities within the normal scope of petitioning which represent attempts to secure anticompetitive governmental responses are exempt
from antitrust liability."' 38 As a consequence, the doctrine is the subject of sharp criticism because it fosters and permits more anticompetitive effects than are necessary to protect the basic right to petition
government. 3 9 "The absolute rule embodied in existing Noerr-Pennington doctrine that ignores direct injury when a genuine petitioning
motive is present and makes no inquiry into less-injurious alternatives
is neither desirable nor constitutionally mandated."' 4 The United
States Supreme Court, however, has not yet applied the first amendment balancing test it has set forth in other contexts.' 4' Instead, as the

137.

This type of activity is also referred to as "predation through governmental process."

BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 347-364 (1978). Sham litigation as a means of predation is gen-

erally successful because "the party seeking to enter the market bears the burden of going forward with evidence" such that "litigation expense may be much heavier for him." Id. at 348.
Although the party opposing entry also incurs expenses, the potential entry generally does not
have the resources to outlast the incumbent. Also, the incumbent may simply wish to delay entry
for a few years through predatory litigation. Id. In addition, this type of predation is "particularly insidious because of its relatively low antitrust visibility" and imposes a significant aggregate annual loss on consumers who would otherwise benefit from unfettered competition. Id. at
348-49.
138. Note, A Standard for Tailoring Noerr-Pennington Immunity More Closely to the First
Amendment Mandate, 95 YALE L.J. 832, 834 (1986). The author argues that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine's blanket protection for anticompetitive conduct is not justified when less-injurious
alternatives to the petitioning activity are available.
139. BORK, supra note 137, at 347-64 ("[plredation by abuse of governmental procedures,
including administrative and judicial processes, presents an increasingly dangerous threat to
competition"); Note, supra note 138, at 838 (Noerr-Pennington doctrine is too broad because,
among other things, it "causes more direct injury than is necessary to protect the interests articulated in Noerr . . . and does not inquire into the existence of alternative means of petitioning
that would cause less injury).
140. Note, supra note 138, at 839.
141. The Court in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), held that:
[g]overnmental regulation incidentally affecting First Amendment freedoms is permit-
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next sections explain, the Court has extended immunity to almost all
forms of anticompetitively-motivated petitioning activity.
A.

The Noerr-Pennington-California Motor Transport Trilogy

In the seminal case of Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v.
Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. ,'142 the United States Supreme Court held
that a group of railroads which allegedly conspired to influence the
passage of laws unfavorable to the trucking industry were not subject
to antitrust liability for such activities. Although the railroads' intent
was to promote anticompetitive legislation through an intensive and
allegedly misleading publicity campaign, the Court ruled that such efforts are protected political activities. The Noerr decision therefore
stands for two broad propositions: (1) an antitrust violation cannot be
based on mere attempts to influence the passage or enforcement of
laws, and (2) competitors may engage in otherwise prohibited concerted efforts to obtain favorable legislative or executive action.
The Court in Noerr distinguished acts forbidden under the antitrust
laws, such as price-fixing, from agreements to jointly seek legislation
or law enforcement. 14 The Court emphasized that:
A construction of [the antitrust laws] that would disqualify people
from taking a public position on matters in which they are
financially interested would thus deprive the government of a
valuable source of information and, at the same time, deprive the
people of their right to petition in the very instances in which that
right may be of the most importance to them.'"
The Court, however, created an exception to the immunity doctrine
where the action "is a mere sham to cover what is actually nothing
more than an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor."'

' 45

Professor Philip Areeda has explained this "sham"
follows:

exception as

[Tihe basic concept, as employed by the Supreme Court, is that the
defendant's activity was intended to injure the plaintiff directly

ted if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest.
Note, supra note 138, at 839 (quoting O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377).
142. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
143. Id. at 136-37.
144. Id. at 139.
145. Id. at 144.
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rather than through a governmental decision. When the antitrust
defendant had not truly sought to influence a governmental decision,
his invocation of governmental machinery is a sham. To be sure, he
would always be pleased to obtain a governmental decision against
his rival. But where he had no reasonable expectation of obtaining
the favorable ruling, his effort to do so was a sham.'"
In general, courts have narrowly construed this exception and found
"shams" to exist in only the more egregious cases, such as where "a
pattern of baseless, repetitive claims" demonstrates an abuse of the
judicial or administrative process. 47 Nonetheless, some courts have
held that a single, baseless suit or protest is sufficient to state an anti8
trust cause of action.'
Four years later, the Court held in United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington 49 that efforts by a combination of a labor union
and large mine operators to influence the Secretary of Labor to set
high minimum wages were immune from the antitrust laws. Smaller
mining companies claimed these joint efforts were designed to make it
more difficult for them to compete. The Court held in favor of the
union and large mine operators and reaffirmed Noerr by stating
"U]oint efforts to influence public officials do not violate the antitrust
laws even though intended to eliminate competition.' 50 The Court
emphasized that such petitioning conduct "is not illegal, either standing alone or as part of a broader scheme itself violative of the Sherman Act.''5
In its 1972 decision in CaliforniaMotor Transport Co. v. Trucking
Unlimited,"52 the Court extended the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine to petitioning activities in administrative and judicial proceedings. The
Court, however, devoted most of its opinion to explaining why the
"sham" exception more readily applies in the administrative and judi-

146. P. AREEDA, ANTrrRuST LAW, 203.1a (Supp. 1990).
147. Id. at 512-13. See generally Annotation, "Sham" Exception to Application of NoerrPennington Doctrine, Exempting From Federal Antitrust Laws Joint Efforts to Influence Governmental Action, 71 A.L.R. Fed. 723 (1985 & Supp. 1990); Annotation, Application of Doctrine Exempting from Federal Antitrust Laws Joint Efforts to Influence Legislative or Executive
Action, 17 A.L.R. Fed. 645 (1973 & Supp. 1990).
148. See, e.g., Clipper Express v. Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau, Inc., 690 F.2d
1240, 1254-57 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1227 (1983). A majority of Justices of the
Supreme Court in Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623 (1977), indicated that the
filing of a single lawsuit might support an antitrust action. See id. at 635-36 n.6 (Rehnquist, J.,
plurality opinion), 660-663 (Stevens, J.dissenting).
149. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
150. Id. at 670.
151. Id.
152. 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
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cial context. A group of trucking companies engaged in a jointly-financed, widely-publicized program in opposition to all applicants
before the California Public Utilities Commission, the Interstate
Commerce Commission, and the courts for the issuance, transfer, or
registration of operating rights. The applicants filed an antitrust action claiming these efforts were designed to bar them from meaningful
access to the agencies and courts.
Although establishing that the "right to petition extends to all departments of the Government" including courts, the Court indicated
that the "sham" exception applied.' In particular, the Court noted
that the complaint contained lengthy allegations that elaborated on
the "sham" theory and that Noerr did not provide immunity under
the alleged facts.
In the present case ... the allegations are not that the conspirators
sought "to influence public officials," but that they sought to bar
their competitors from meaningful access to adjudicatory tribunals
and so to usurp that decisionmaking process.' 4
The Court also modified the application of the "sham" exception in
the administrative and judicial context by stating that misrepresenta5
tions, otherwise permitted in the political arena, are not immunized.'
In addition, wrongful conduct and practices that may corrupt the administrative or judicial processes may result in a finding of "sham"
activity. In short, the Court explained that subversion of the administrative or judicial process is not immune because petition clause rights
56
cannot be used as a pretext to achieve substantive evils.
B.

Omni Outdoor Advertising

This trilogy of cases provided the foundation upon which lower
courts built a substantial base of precedent over the last twenty years.
These precedents did not consistently define the parameters of the
"sham" exception or state whether a "conspiracy" exception to the

153. Id. at 510.
154. Id. at 511-12.
155. For example, in the certificate of need context a hospital has more leeway in petitioning
the Legislature for revisions of the certificate of need statute than it has in administratively
challenging a certificate of need applicant.
156. California Motor Transport, 404 U.S. at 511-12.
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doctrine existed. 57 The Supreme Court's recent decision in City of
Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc.,1s however, makes
plain that the "sham" exception is a narrow one and that a conspiracy exception is not available. As discussed above, in Omni Outdoor
Advertising the corporate officials of a dominant billboard advertising
company had very close relations with city officials and lobbied these
officials to enact restrictive zoning ordinances that hindered a competing billboard company's ability to compete. The rival company sued
both the city and the dominant billboard company alleging federal
and state antitrust violations. The two primary claims against the
dominant billboard company were that it engaged in "sham" lobbying activities and that it engaged in an anticompetitive conspiracy with
the city. The dominant billboard company claimed Noerr-Pennington
immunity, but a jury returned a verdict for the rival company. The
trial judge granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict to the defendants, but the Fourth Circuit reinstated the jury's verdict. 59
In reversing the court of appeals, the Supreme Court emphasized
that the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine is a necessary adjunct to the state
action doctrine. The Parker and Noerr decisions "are complementary
expressions of the principle that the antitrust laws regulate business,
not politics; the former decision protects the States' acts of governing,
and the latter the citizens' participation in government." 160 Based on
this business-politics dichotomy, the Court rejected the relevance of
whether "a private party's political motives are selfish" because
"'Noerr shields from the Sherman Act a concerted effort to influence
public officials regardless of intent or purpose.""' 6' Thus, at the out-

157. Some lower federal courts, including the majority in the Fourth Circuit's panel opinion
in Omni Outdoor Advertising, had recognized a "conspiracy" exception where a government
official conspires with a private party to engage in anticompetitive conduct. See Affiliated Capital Corp. v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 1555 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom.,
Gulf Coast Cable Television Co. v. Affiliated Capital Corp., 474 U.S. 1053 (1986); Westborough Mall, Inc. v. City of Cape Girardeau, 693 F.2d 733 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nom.,
Drury v. Westborough Mall, Inc., 461 U.S. 945 (1983). Some commentators urged the recognition of the public official conspiracy exception in situations where regulators manipulate the
process to serve private anticompetitive ends. See, e.g., Miller, Antitrust and Certificate of
Need: Health Systems Agencies, the Planning Act, and Regulatory Capture, 68 Gao. L.J. 873
(1980) (discussing state action and Noerr-Pennington doctrines as well).
158. 111 S. Ct. 1344 (1991).
159. Omni Outdoor Adv., 891 F.2d 1127.
160. Omni Outdoor Adv., 111 S. Ct. at 1355. The Court noted it would be "peculiar in a
democracy, and perhaps in derogation of the constitutional right 'to petition the Government for
a redress of grievances,' to establish a category of lawful state action that citizens are not permitted to urge." Id. at 1353 (citation omitted).
161. Id. at 1354 (emphasis added) (quoting United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington,
381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965)). The Court's reference to "political motivations" would seemingly
permit consideration of economic or business motivations (except to the extent such economic or
business motivations are considered political).
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set, the Court established that anticompetitive intent is not a relevant
factor.
The Court rejected the lower court's application of the "sham" exception to the dominant billboard company's lobbying activities.
Nonetheless, the Court reiterated its holding in California Motor
Transport that a 'sham' situation involves a defendant whose activities are 'not genuinely aimed at procuring favorable government action' at all, . . . not one 'who genuinely seeks to achieve his
governmental result, but does so through improper means."' 62 The
Court limited the "sham" to "situations in which persons use the
governmental process-as opposed to the outcome of that process-as
an anticompetitive weapon." 6 3
In particular, the challenged petitioning activity must directly interfere with the rival's business relationships. 1" On this point, the Court
rejected the theory that the dominant billboard company's lobbying
activities were designed to directly interfere with its rival's business.
The Court stated that although the dominant billboard company "indisputably set out to disrupt [its rival's] business relationships, it
sought to do so not through the very process of lobbying, or of causing the city council to consider zoning measures, but rather through
the ultimate product of that lobbying and consideration, viz., the zoning ordinances."' 165 Because the defendant's lobbying efforts were a
step removed from the government's actual imposition of the restrictive zoning regulation and were, in the Court's view, a genuine attempt to influence governmental action, no "sham" conduct
occurred. i6
The Court also rejected the theory that the dominant billboard
company's lobbying efforts were not immune because they were designed to delay its rival's entry into the market or deny it meaningful
access to the city's administrative and legislative forums. 67 First, the
Court held that lobbying activities where the purpose is to delay a
competitor's entry into a market are not a "sham" unless "the delay
is sought to be achieved only by the lobbying process itself, and not

162. Id. (quoting Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 500 n.4
& 508 n.10 (1988)).
163. Id.
164. The Court relied on itsstatement in Noerr that immunity does not extend to an action
which "is a mere sham to cover what isactually nothing more than an attempt to interfere
directly with the business relationships of a competitor." Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v.
Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 144 (1961).
165. City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adv., Inc., III S.Ct. 1344, 1354 (1991).
166. Id.
167. Id.
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by the governmental action that the lobbying seeks. 1 68 In this case,
any delay that resulted was only a byproduct of the genuine lobbying
efforts of the dominant billboard company. Second, the Court found
that if any denial of meaningful access was achieved it was through an
attempt to influence city officials "that, far from being a 'sham,' was
69
if anything more in earnest than it should have been." 1
Any lobbyist or applicant, in addition to getting himself heard, seeks
by procedural and other means to get his opponent ignored. Policing
the legitimate boundaries of such defensive strategies, when they are
conducted in the context of a genuine attempt to influence
0
governmental action, is not the role of the Sherman Act. 17
Based on its enunciated principle that the antitrust laws regulate business and not politics, the Court was unwilling to extend antitrust liability "to a context in which the regulatory process is being invoked
genuinely, and not in a 'sham' fashion.''
In considering the issue for the first time, the Court also rejected a
"conspiracy" exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine for the
same reasons it rejected such an exception to the state action doctrine. 72 The Court's rationale for rejecting the exception is the impracticability of defining and identifying what constitutes an illegal
"conspiracy" in the context of lobbying and petitioning activities.
If . . . "conspiracy" means nothing more than an agreement to
impose the regulation in question[,J . . . since it is both inevitable
and desirable that public officials often agree to do what one or
another group of private citizens urges upon them, such an exception
would virtually swallow up the Parker rule: All anticompetitive
regulation would be vulnerable to a "conspiracy" charge.7
As the Court stated, '"[ilt would be unlikely that any effort to influence legislative action could succeed unless one or more members of
the legislative body became . . . 'co-conspirators' in some sense with
the private party urging such action.' ' 74 The Court also found it impracticable to identify whether lawmaking "has been infected by self-

168.

Id.
169. Id. at 1355. "If the denial was wrongful there may be other remedies, but as for the
Sherman Act, the Noerr exemption applies." Id.
170. Id.
171. City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adv., Inc., 111 S.Ct. 1344, 1355 (1991).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1351.
174. Id.at 1355 (citations omitted).
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ishly motivated agreement with private interests" or whether
"lobbying... has produced selfishly motivated agreement with public officials."'7 In either instance, the Court was unwilling to sanction
such inquiries.
In addition, the Court held that the policies of the antitrust laws do
76
not impose a code of ethics on public officials or private parties.
Thus, the Court also rejected a "conspiracy" exemption that would
be limited to instances of governmental "corruption." The Court's
holding is based on the inherent difficulties in determining what
would constitute "corruption" for purposes of the exception.'" For
instance, if "corruption" were defined as not acting in the public interest, it would be impractical to determine whether an official acted
in the "public interest" or his or her own "private interest." Similarly, if "corruption" were defined as some unlawful activity under
federal or state law, such as bribery, the purposes of the antitrust laws
are not furthered by prohibitions on such activities. If "the invalidating 'conspiracy' is limited to one that involves some element of unlawfulness (beyond mere anticompetitive motivation), the invalidation
would have nothing to do with the policies of the antitrust laws.' 7 8
C. Limitations on Noerr-Pennington Immunity
Although Noerr-Pennington protects certain "petitioning" activities that would otherwise be unlawful under the antitrust laws, it does
not protect certain "nonpetitioning" restraints or agreements. For example, in FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association, 79 the Supreme Court held that a boycott by criminal defense attorneys who
represented indigent defendants to increase statutorily set attorneys'
fees violated the antitrust laws and was not immune under the first
amendment. The Court rejected the attorneys' Noerr-Pennington argument because the attorneys' boycott was the means by which the
attorneys sought favorable legislation rather than the governmentallysought consequence of permissible lobbying activities.1' 8 In essence,
the attorneys engaged in an impermissible restraint on competition,
the consequences of which had the same effect as favorable legislation
(i.e., higher attorneys' fees). Under the antitrust laws, however, the
attorneys could not lawfully achieve the anticompetitive result them-

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id.
Id. at 1352.
City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adv., Inc., 11I S. Ct. 1344, 1352 (1991).
Id. at 1356.
110 S. Ct. 768 (1990).
Id. at 867.

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LA WREVIEW

180

[Vol. 19:149

selves through a direct and private restraint on trade. Instead, they
would have to seek the result through permissible joint lobbying activities in order to acquire Noerr-Pennington immunity. Further, the
Court found that the social justification underlying the attorneys' restraint made it no less unlawful. The Court therefore rejected the argument that Noerr-Penningtonimmunity extends to "every concerted
effort that is genuinely intended to influence governmental action."''
A final limiting principle is that competitors who engage in anticompetitive acts under the guise of a private association do not necessarily attain Noerr-Pennington immunity. In Allied Tube & Conduit
Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc. ,182 the Supreme Court held that a private
association that set and published product standards and codes was
not a "quasi-legislative" body for Noerr-Pennington antitrust immunity purposes even though Legislatures routinely adopted such standards and codes. The Court held that an economically interested party
that exercises decision-making authority in formulating product standards for an association that is made up of market participants has no
antitrust immunity from the anticompetitive effects the standard
causes in the marketplace." 3
The importance of Superior Court Trial Lawyers and Allied Tube
in the certificate of need context is twofold. First, private concerted
conduct that merely imposes a restraint on competition does not have
Noerr-Pennington immunity. Private petitioning activities are
shielded, provided they do not constitute a "sham." In the certificate
of need context, concerted agreements of incumbent certificate holders that are designed to impose a direct restraint on competition,
rather than influence a health care agency's decision, are unprotected
activities. Second, the private concerted conduct of economically-interested participants does not have Noerr-Pennington immunity even
though governmental agencies routinely rely upon and adopt the information the association provides. In the certificate of need context,
"quasi-governmental" health care agencies and associations and incumbent certificate holders may engage in concerted conduct designed
to eliminate competition. Such conduct, however, may not have antitrust immunity.
Noerr-Pennington and the Certificateof Need Process
Courts tend to have an expansive conception of Noerr-Pennington
immunity and appear unwilling to find "shams" unless particularly
D.

181.

Id. (quoting from Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492

(1988).
182.
183.

486 U.S. 492 (1988).
Id. at 499.

1991]

CER TIFICA TE OF NEED

egregious conduct is evident. Cases alleging "sham" petitioning activities in the certificate of need context illustrate this tendency because
such cases have generally been met with judicial skepticism. '8 For example, courts have established broad antitrust immunity for a hospital's opposition to a certificate of need applicant,' 85 agreements
among hospitals to oppose a certificate of need application, 86 and
agreements among hospitals not to oppose each other's certificate of
need applications.187 Although courts have a reluctance to interfere
with most "petitioning" activities in the certificate of need context,
not all "petitioning" activities are immune from antitrust scrutiny.
For instance, in St. Joseph's Hospital v. Hospital Corp. of America,188 an existing certificate holder had intervened in the administrative proceedings and delayed the issuance of a certificate of need for
new cardiac surgical services to an applicant.8 9 The applicant alleged
that the incumbent medical center deliberately submitted misrepresentations to the Georgia state health planning agency that administered
the certificate of need program in an effort to obstruct the issuance of
a certificate of need. Although the district court found such misrepresentations provided no support for the application of the "sham" ex-

184. See Lake Otis Clinic, Inc. v. Sisters of Providence No. 90-35064, 921 F.2d 280 (9th Cir.
1990) (unpublished disposition) (WESTLAW, ALLFEDS database) (summary judgment proper
for defendant on complaining hospital's "capture" theory that state health care agencies conspired with opposing hospital to revoke hospital's certificate of need); Potters Medical Center v.
City Hosp. Ass'n, 800 F.2d 568 (6th Cir. 1986) (hospital's opposition to certificate of need not a
"sham" and was immune from antitrust liability); St. Joseph's Hosp. v. Hospital Corp. of Am.,
795 F.2d 948 (1lth Cir. 1986) (delaying tactics, motions to dismiss, and appeals are "clearly
immune"); Huron Valley Hosp., Inc. v. City of Pontiac, 650 F. Supp. 1325 (E.D. Mich.) (agreement among hospitals to oppose certificate of need application "clearly protected" under NoerrPennington), aff'd, 849 F.2d 262 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 942 (1988); General
Hosp. of Humana, Inc. v. Baptist Medical Sys., Inc., 1986-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,996 (E.D.
Ark. 1986) (hospitals' opposition to certificate of need immune; hospitals' agreement not to
oppose each other's certificate of need applications also immune); cf. Hospital Bldg. Co. v.
Trustees of Rex Hosp., 691 F.2d 678 (4th Cir. 1982) (baseless appeal, misrepresentations, and
conspiracy with government officials fall within sham exception), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 890 &
904 (1983); see generally Annotation, Opposition to Construction of New Hospital or Expansion
of Existing Hospital's Facilities as Violation of Sherman Act, 88 A.L.R. FED. 478 (1988).
185. Potters Medical Center v. City Hosp. Ass'n, 800 F.2d 568 (6th Cir. 1986); General
Hosps. of Humana, Inc. v. Baptist Medical Sys., Inc., 1986-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,996 (E.D.
Ark. 1986).
186. Huron Valley Hosp., Inc. v. City of Pontiac, 650 F. Supp. 1325 (E.D. Mich.), aff'd,
849 F.2d. 262 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 942 (1988).
187. General Hosps. of Humana, Inc. v. Baptist Medical Sys., lnc, 1986-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 166,996 (E.D. Ark. 1986).
188. 795 F.2d 948 (1lth Cir. 1986).
189. Notably, this case involves only one independent competitor opposing the issuance of a
certificate of need-not a joint, concerted effort by a number of competitors.
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ception,190 the Eleventh Circuit permitted the plaintiff's antitrust
actions to proceed based on this alleged provision of misinformation.

'9'

The appellate court, however, held that a competitor's delaying tactics, motions to dismiss, and appeals in the certificate of need administrative context are "clearly immune" from antitrust liability. 192
Relying upon Noerr, the court held the plaintiffs did not allege the
defendants did "anything more than use the adjudicatory process to
obtain a favorable outcome. In spite of the damaging effect [on the
applicant], the defendants were within their rights to use every available legal means to delay or forestall the CON being issued and the
anti-competitive purpose did not make them illegal." 93
The court's unwillingness in St. Joseph's Hospital to recognize a
"sham" exception for activities designed to delay the issuance of a
certificate of need is questionable in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Omni Outdoor Advertising. The Court retained the viability
of a "sham" exception based on delay tactics provided it is shown
that "the delay is sought to be achieved only by the lobbying process
itself, and not by the governmental action that the lobbying seeks." l9
In other words, the use of petitioning activities simply to delay the
issuance of a certificate of need does not have antitrust immunity. Delays resulting from the governmental action sought' 95 or delays resulting as a necessary by-product of genuine litigation efforts in
opposition to applicants do have antitrust immunity. Thus, the court's
expansive language in St. Joseph's Hospital should not be read so
broadly as to condone all "delaying tactics."
In another certificate of need action, the Fourth Circuit in Hospital
Building Co. v. Trustees of Rex HospitaP96 reviewed an antitrust ver-

190. 620 F. Supp. 814, 830 (S.D. Ga. 1985), vacated and remanded, 795 F.2d 948 (11th Cir.
1986).
191. 795 F.2d at 955.
192. Id. Georgia requires all health care facilities to obtain a certificate of need from the
State Health Planning Agency (SHPA) prior to implementation or expansion of any health services. Id. at 950. Cf. Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 691 F.2d 678, 687 (4th Cir.
1982) (no antitrust immunity for "baseless appeal[s] ... with intent to delay approval" of application for certificate of need), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 890 & 904 (1983).
193. St. Joseph's Hosp., 795 F.2d at 955. Such delaying tactics would not be permissible,
however, if they form a pattern of baseless, repetitive claims. California Motor Transp. Co. v.
Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513 (1972).
194. City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adv., Inc., I 1lS. Ct. 1344, 1361(1991).
195. For instance, a situation might arise where an incumbent certificate holder succeeds in
its request for the imposition of a moratorium on the issuance of approved, but currently unissued, certificates. The incumbent certificate holder's actions would be immune because the delay
is the product of the governmental action sought to be achieved.
196. 691 F.2d 678 (4th Cir. 1982).
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dict in favor of a Raleigh, North Carolina hospital whose certificate
of need application had been actively opposed in administrative and
judicial proceedings by a competing hospital. The court rejected the
defendant hospital's claim of Noerr-Penningtonimmunity stating that
"[a]ctions taken to discourage and ultimately prevent competitors
from meaningful access to the processes of administrative agencies fall
within the sham exception."' 97 In support of its conclusion that the
sham exception applied, the court referred to three factors. First, the
court stated that proof that the defendants conspired with government
officials with the intent to foreclose access to the certificate of need
process is within the sham exception.1 98 Second, the court held that the
defendants were not immune if they engaged in a baseless appeal with
the intent to delay approval of the plaintiff's certificate of need and
thereby delay plaintiff's entry into the market.199 Third, the defendants allegedly engaged in misrepresentations made with the intent to
deny meaningful access to the certificate of need process2 0°
Although the case was remanded on other grounds and the jury ultimately returned a verdict for the defendants, 20 ' the court's conclusions in Hospital Building Co. regarding Noerr-Penningtonimmunity
are noteworthy. In particular, its holding that a baseless appeal for
the purpose of delaying approval of a certificate of need is not immune appears to be contrary to the Eleventh Circuit's holding in St.
Joseph's Hospital. The different outcomes may be attributable to the
plaintiff's failure in St. Joseph's Hospital's to allege that the defendants knew or should have known that their advocacy was baseless
and therefore a "sham. ' 20 2 In contrast, the jury instruction in Hospital Building Co. made clear that actions without a "genuine intent" to
influence an agency or court are a sham. 20 3 Nonetheless, in light of the
Supreme Court's decision in Omni Outdoor Advertising, it appears
that the "sham" exception remains viable for actions in which delay is
sought to be achieved only through the litigation process itself. In addition, the deliberate submission of misrepresentations to state health
agencies that administer certificate of need programs in order to ob-

197. Id. at 687.
198. Id. This factor may be irrelevant in light of Omni Outdoor Advertising.
199. Id.
200. The trial court, however, failed to give the proper instruction on this matter. Id. at 688.
201. Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 791 F.2d 288 (4th Cir. 1986). The jury
specifically found that the hospital's opposition to the certificate of need application was not a
sham. Id. at 290.
202. St. Joseph's Hosp. v. Hospital Auth. of Am., 620 F. Supp. 814, 831-32 (S.D. Ga. 1985)
(citing Greenwood Util. v. Mississippi Power Co., 751 F.2d 1484, 1500 (5th Cir. 1985)), vacated
and remanded, 795 F.2d 948 (11 th Cir. 1986).
203. 791 F.2d at 293.
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struct the issuance of a certificate of need may qualify for the "sham"
exception.

IV.

APPLICATION OF THE STATE ACTION TEST AND NOERR-

PENNINoTON

DOCTRINE TO FLORIDA'S CERTIFICATE OF NEED PROGRAM

No reported cases have addressed the extent to which Florida's certificate of need program immunizes the otherwise anticompetitive actions of certificate holders. Nor have any reported cases addressed the
application of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine to petitioning activities
in Florida's certificate of need application process. Given this lack of
definitive guidance, the next two sections explore the limits of antitrust immunity of both doctrines under Florida's certificate of need
program, with particular emphasis on those types of agreements described earlier in this Article. 2 4
A.

State Action Immunity

In order to establish state action immunity under Florida's certificate of need program for a particular challenged activity, an institutional health care provider must demonstrate that (1) Florida has
clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed a policy of displacing
competition for the provision of health care facilities and services with
regulation, and (2) Florida actively supervises and controls the private
parties' otherwise anticompetitive conduct. Florida's certificate of
need program clearly meets this test for conduct such as monopolization of health care markets through the legitimate acquisition of certificates of need. The program, however, does not appear to satisfy
this two-part state action immunity test for certain types of anticompetitive activities described below.
Under the first part of the test, the certificate of need program reflects a general state policy to displace open-market competition with
a regulatory regime that HRS administers. The preceding review of
Florida's certificate of need program indicates that the Florida Legislature intended that the program be a combination of health care
planning activities and a quasi-competitive comparative review process
for the issuance of certificates. For instance, HRS sets the level of bed
capacity statewide, scrutinizing certificate of need applications to determine whether expansions are necessary and appropriate. Thus, a
health care company's acquisition of certificates of need such that it
monopolizes bed capacity in a particular geographic or service mar-

204.

See supra text accompanying notes 71-203.
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ket, for example, would be immunized from antitrust scrutiny because
the certificate of need program is "intended to supplant competition
with respect to expansion of bed capacity.

' 20 5

Any "monopoly" that

results through the acquisition of bed capacity would therefore be
state-authorized.
The state's general regulation of health care markets, however, does
not necessarily immunize all otherwise anticompetitive conduct. 206 As
two health care commentators have suggested, "courts will scrutinize
closely the claimed state authorization to determine whether it was actually intended to encompass the particular anticompetitive activity. ' ' 207 Notably, Florida's certificate of need statutes do not explicitly
authorize health care competitors to engage in private anticompetitive
conduct such as (1) market allocation or protection agreements including agreements to oppose (or not to oppose) particular applications or
not to apply in particular districts, (2) agreements to stagger competition for certificate of need applications in particular batches, or (3)
otherwise impermissible information-sharing agreements .2 08
The question arises whether such conduct is a foreseeable result of
Florida certificate of need programs. The answer appears to be no.
First, no statute directly or impliedly supports the notion that the Legislature intended to authorize sub rosa agreements to restrain or eliminate the quasi-competitive comparative review process for the issuance
of certificates. Second, the Legislature explicitly retained the goal of
economic efficiency and competition, which reinforces the position
that the certificate of need program only displaces competition to the
degree necessary to administer the program. Thus, under the rationale
of Bolt v. Halifax HospitalMedical Center,20 9 these types of anticom-

205. See, e.g., General Hosps. of Humana v. Baptist Medical Sys., 1986-1, Trade Cas.
66,996, at 62,116 (E.D. Ark. 1986). As discussed elsewhere in this Article, the acquisition of
certificates through illegitimate and unauthorized administrative procedures or petitioning practices may negate Noerr-Penningtonimmunity.
206. See Note, Antitrust and Certificate of Need: A Doubtful Prognosis, 69 IowA L. REv.
1451 (1984). The author concludes that although state action immunity may be available for
certain planning activities subject to certificate of need requirements, such as "consolidations,
joint ventures and acquisitions," other types of activities, particularly in conjunction with local
health agencies, "run substantial antitrust risks." Id. at 1474.
207. Walbolt & Pankau, Antitrust, Public Health-Care Institutions, and the Developing
Law, 1980 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 385, 398.
208. Because HRS acquires data from health care providers, a greater degree of competitive
and strategic information is available to health care competitors than in other industries. Nevertheless, agreements to share strategic information beyond that disclosed through the regulatory
process may support an antitrust claim.
209. 891 F.2d 810 (1 1th Cir. 1990), on remandfrom, 874 F.2d 755 (11th Cir. 1989), reinstating opinion in part on reh'g from, 861 F.2d 1233 (1 lth Cir.), granting reh'g and vacating opinion from, 851 F.2d 1273 (1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1960 (1990).
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petitive practices are not a foreseeable consequence of certificate of
need regulation, nor are they necessary to achieve the certificate of
need statute's purpose of providing high quality, cost-effective health
care. In fact, these practices are inconsistent with the quasi-competitive model the statute envisions 210 for the acquisition and retention of
21
certificates of need. 1
Under Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United
States,212 however, a health care provider could argue that because
Florida clearly intended to displace competition in the health care
field with a regulatory structure, the first part of the Midcal test is
satisfied. A provider who acts pursuant to such an anticompetitive
regulatory program need not "point to a specific detailed legislative
authorization" for its challenged conduct. Unlike the Public Service
Commission in Southern Motor Carriers,however, HRS has not authorized these types of anticompetitive agreements. Furthermore, it is
doubtful under Florida law whether HRS has the necessary authority
and discretion to authorize such agreements. 213 Thus, it appears likely
that Florida's certificate of need statute does not meet the first part of
the Midcal test for these types of agreements.
Second, even assuming the first part is met, the state does not actively supervise these particular types of anticompetitive practices.
Neither the certificate of need statute nor HRS administrative rules
authorize or provide a policing mechanism for agreements between
health care providers to oppose (or not oppose) particular certificate
of need applications, to stagger competition, or to share strategic information. The state collects and analyzes marketplace data and economic conditions and essentially sets the output levels in the industry
(i.e., number of beds). The state also monitors provider compliance
with conditions contained in certificates of need. Nonetheless, because
no state supervision of market allocation or protection agreements,
staggered competition agreements, or information sharing agreements

210. As discussed above, the certificate of need statutes explicitly require that market economics be used in establishing methodologies for determining needs and that the competitive
impact of proposed facilities and services be considered. FLA. STAT. §§ 381.704(3),.705(l)(1)

(1989).
211. Although HRS controls the total level of output in Florida health care markets, it does
not control individual health care providers' decisions regarding what portion of the markets
they wish to serve.
212. 471 U.S. 48 (1985).
213. HRS has no express authority to develop rules or standards for creating or reviewing
such agreements on a periodic basis. See generally Consolidated Gas Co. v. City Gas Co., 880
F.2d 297 (11th Cir.), reh'g granted and opinion vacated, 889 F.2d 264 (1989), on reh'g, 912 F.2d
1262 (11 th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (reinstating panel opinion), cert. granted and judgment vacated
as moot, 111 S. Ct. 1300(1991).
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exists, the second part of Midcal does not appear to be satisfied.21 4 As
the court in Patrick stated, the "mere presence of some state involve25
ment or monitoring does not suffice." 1
A particularly interesting situation arises when a certificate of need
holder stipulates with other certificate holders or an applicant to withdraw from a certificate of need administrative proceeding on the condition that the certificate holders or applicant not oppose each other's
existing or future certificate applications. Under the analysis above,
such an anticompetitive agreement, if entered outside of the administrative proceeding context, would not be entitled to state action immunity. The fact that the stipulation is entered as a part of the
administrative process muddles the analysis. If the stipulation is not
subject to the scrutiny or approval of a hearing officer or HRS, the
requisite active supervision and control is lacking. In instances where
a hearing officer formally approves the stipulation, the question is
whether this quasi-judicial approval of the stipulation meets the active
supervision prong. Under the rationale of Consolidated Gas Co. of
Florida v. City Gas Co.,216 the hearing officer's approval would not
provide the requisite oversight. 217 In either case, state action immunity
may be unavailable because the certificate of need statutes do not explicitly provide for such stipulations, nor do they appear to be a foreseeable result of the certificate of need program.
B.

Noerr-Pennington Immunity

The extent of Noerr-Penningtonimmunity in the certificate of need
context is a difficult and divisive issue. It is clear that certain types of
petitioning activities are protected. For example, an existing certificate
holder is immune from antitrust attack for unilaterally challenging
certificate of need applications in administrative and judicial proceedings even if the certificate holder's purpose is to inhibit the entry of
new health care providers. This type of effort has immunity because
Florida's certificate of need regulations explicitly permit existing
health care facilities that hold certificates to initiate or intervene in
administrative hearings to contest the issuance of certificates of need

214. See, e.g., North Carolina ex rel. Edmisten v. P.I.A. Asheville, Inc., 740 F.2d 274, 278
(4th Cir. 1984) (no continuous, ongoing state scrutiny because certificate of need statute "in no
way attempts to monitor the conduct of health care providers to be sure it is in harmony with the
expressed goals of" federal and state legislation), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1003 (1985).
215. Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 101 (1988).
216. 880 F.2d 297 (11th Cir. 1989), reh'g granted and opinion vacated, 889 F.2d 264 (1989),
on reh'g, 912 F.2d 297 (1 1th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (per curiam opinion reinstating panel opinion),
cert. granted and judgment vacated as moot, I I I S. Ct. 1300 (1991).
217. It is uncertain whether HRS has or would approve such a stipulation in a final order.
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that affect their health care programs. 2 8 Further, such unilateral administrative and judicial activities are communicative petitioning activities to which courts have unhesitatingly applied Noerr-Pennington
immunity. Similarly, a hospital may encourage and influence its former patients to file good faith complaints with a state medical board
against a competitor who is applying for a certificate of need without
incurring antitrust liability. 2 9 Of course, encouraging or filing false
22°
complaints has no Noerr-Penningtonimmunity.
The potential exists for the application of the sham exception to
bad faith, abusive, access-barring activities, particularly those designed to delay proceedings or to mislead HRS, a hearing officer, or a
court. Although delays attributable to permissible intervention before
administrative agencies that necessarily forestall the issuance of a certificate of need are generally permissible under Noerr-Pennington,
tactics intended solely to delay issuance of a certificate of need may
constitute "sham" activities."' In general, the sham exception does
not apply so long as the activities before the agency or court are procedurally permissible, not misleading, and undertaken for the genuine
purpose of achieving lawful governmental action (and not undertaken
solely for delay).
Noerr-Pennington immunity is available for certain types of joint
petitioning activities as well. In general, the extent of Noerr-Pennington immunity available to competitors for concerted efforts to petition government is no greater than is available to trade associations.
Although trade associations have protected first amendment rights to
petition government, these rights do not extend to "every concerted
effort that is genuinely intended to influence governmental action."M
The first amendment rights of hospitals to engage in concerted efforts
to oppose, or not oppose, certificate of need applications are similarly
limited.
For example, existing certificate holders could collectively agree to
lobby on behalf of legislation that altered the certificate of need program. Such petitioning activity, which is similar to trade association

218. FLA. STAT. § 381.709(5)(b) (1989).
219. Garst v. Stoco, Inc., 604 F. Supp. 326, 333 (W.D. Ark. 1985).
220. Id.
221. City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1344 (1991) (delay
attributable to genuine efforts to influence governmental action nonactionable; however, efforts
solely to achieve delay not immune); compare St. Joseph's Hosp. v. Hospital Corp. of Am., 795
F.2d 948, 955 (11 th Cir. 1986) (immunity for delaying tactics), with Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 691 F.2d 678, 687 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 890 & 904 (1983) (no
immunity for baseless appeal with intent to delay certificate of need proceedings).
222. FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 110 S. Ct. 768, 784 (1990) (quoting from
Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 503 (1988)).

19911

CERTIFICATE OF NEED

lobbying activities, is entitled to first amendment protection. Certificate holders could also administratively and judicially oppose a certificate of need application in their geographic area unless such concerted
efforts were a "sham.''m However, an agreement among certificate
holders to oppose all applications in their respective geographic areas,
regardless of each application's merit, would not be entitled to immunity. First, the agreement is a direct restraint on competition much
like the attorneys' boycott in FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers
Association.2 24 Second, such an agreement would constitute a "sham"
because it has no purpose other than to injure the applicants directly,
particularly if there is no reasonable expectation that an application is
necessarily deficient. In addition, courts have repeatedly stated that
Noerr-Penningtonimmunity does not extend to activities that abuse
the administrative process. 2 5 Thus, a blanket agreement to oppose all
applications would abuse the quasi-competitive process upon which
the certificate of need application procedure is based and would therefore not be immune from antitrust liability.
An agreement among certificate holders not to oppose particular
certificate of need applications (or one another's applications) may
also be unprotected. It is clear that a hospital's unilateral decision to
not oppose a certificate of need application is immune. 226 A concerted

agreement not to oppose applications, however, is a different type of
restraint and does not fall within the types of petitioning activities for
which the Noerr-Pennington doctrine provides protection. Such an
agreement is not a traditional "petitioning" activity and is more akin
to a direct restraint on competition like that condemned in Superior
Court Trial Lawyers. Because the restraint has little or no communicative or informative value, antitrust liability for this type of restraint
on competition is possible.

223. California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 511 (1972); Huron
Valley Hosp., Inc. v. City of Pontiac, 650 F. Supp. 1325 (E.D. Mich.) (agreement among hospitals to oppose certificate of need application "clearly protected" under Noerr-Pennington),
aff'd, 849 F.2d. 262 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 942 (1988); General Hosps. of Humana, Inc. v. Baptist Medical Sys., Inc, 1986-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 66,996 (E.D. Ark. 1986)
(hospitals' opposition to certificate of need immune).
224. 110 S. Ct. 768 (1990).
225. Even in Omni OutdoorAdvertising, the Court reaffirmed its holding in CaliforniaMotor Transport"that a conspiracy among private parties to monopolize trade by excluding a competitor from participation in the regulatory process [does] not enjoy Noerr protection." City of
Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adv., Inc., 111 S.Ct. 1344 (1991).
226. See, e.g., General Hosps. of Humana, Inc. v. Baptist Medical Sys., Inc, 1986-1 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 66,996 at 62,118 (E.D. Ark. 1986) ("just as a party may oppose a competitor's
proposal before [the agency] without fear of antitrust liability, a party may choose not to oppose
a competitor's proposal without fear of liability").
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In summary, the scope of Noerr-Penningtonimmunity is a protean
concept that depends upon a number of conflicting factors. Opponents to certificate of need applications will attempt to wrap the first
amendment around their otherwise anticompetitive actions while applicants will claim such actions are baseless and a sham. Despite the
fact that courts have generally upheld immunity for certain petitioning
activities in the certificate of need context, Noerr-Penningtonimmunity does not necessarily extend to every unilateral or concerted effort
to affect a certificate of need application. Certain anticompetitive actions and agreements, particularly those with no informational or
communicative value, may fall beyond Noerr-Pennington'sreach.
V.

CONCLUSION

Florida's certificate of need statutes immunize many otherwise anticompetitive activities of private parties. They may not, however, satisfy the two-part state action immunity test for private agreements to
share strategic information, agreements not to oppose particular applications or apply in particular districts, and agreements to stagger
competition for certificate of need applications in particular batches.
Although the certificate of need program displaces free-market competition with a regulatory regime, it does not explicitly authorize or
actively supervise these particular types of anticompetitive agreements. Noerr-Penningtonimmunity may be available, however, if the
challenged conduct involves administrative or judicial challenges to
the issuance of certificates of need, provided such conduct is a genuine attempt to invoke the governmental process and is not merely intended to delay or deny an applicant's access to the certificate of need
process. Certain concerted efforts to oppose or not to oppose certificate of need applications may not be entitled to such immunity as either "sham" activities or because they are beyond the protections of
the first amendment petition clause.

